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## The Week

MR. SECRETARY HUGHES in his note of invitation to the Conference has indicated clearly the relative emphasis which should be placed upon its objects. It is "a conference on the subject of limitation of armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions should also be discussed." The reasons for limitation of armament are presented as absolute—the enormous weight of armament upon enterprise and production, its standing menace to the peace of the world. The relation of questions liable to cause collision between the powers to this fundamental object logically follows. "There can be no final assurance of the peace of the world in the absence of the desire for peace"; and this desire must find effect in "a practical effort to remove causes of misunderstanding." In other words, the willingness of the nations concerned to discuss questions at issue and to find grounds of agreement will be the test of their honesty in seeking disarmament. There can be no fault found with Mr. Hughes's logic. Whether his psychology is as good as Senator Borah's will never be known. The atmosphere of a poker game is quite different when the players have no guns. It was Senator Borah's idea that England, America and Japan should agree to limit armament as a virtual pledge to exclude the factor of force in decisions, and then come to a showdown of the cards. Secretary Hughes believes that the showdown must precede any pledge of disarmament that can be trusted. There is something to be said in favor of both points of view. At all events the conference must show the world what its exact situation is, and whither it is tending. To say peace when there is no peace would be the supreme failure.

THE Silesian question has entered on a new phase. The Supreme Council has passed the buck to the League of Nations. The League has to its credit one successful decision of disputed territory, that of the Aland Islands; but in that case the contending powers were Sweden and Finland, both relatively pacific nations, and the economic life of neither was at stake. On the other hand, the League has had one disgraceful failure in its impotence in regard to the Polish seizure of Vilna. In view of the fact that Poland is represented in the League of Nations and Germany is not, the cards may be said to be stacked against the latter. Since whatever decision the League may make can be vetoed by any member of the present incoherent Supreme Council sitting in the Executive Council of the League, the deadlock may be said to continue, and the whole affair reminds one of a badly written play in which a change of scene does duty for progress of the action.

IN view of the difficulties on every side, the prediction may be hazarded that the League will not decide the ownership of Silesia between Poland and Germany, but maintain the province as a separate and neutral industrial unit under its own direction.


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This would be, of course, a violation of the Treaty of Versailles, but one far less monstrous than that which has already taken place through the failure of the Allied Commission to preserve order, and the connivance of its commanders at the Polish insurrection. If the League of Nations can give the inhabitants of Silesia protection, and preserve the economic integrity of the country, it will have shown a justification for its existence, far beyond any of its present achievements.

THE campaign of falsehood against Russia continues. The most striking instance is that of the Chicago Tribune, which on August 2nd published an inflammatory account of a riot in Moscow with a photograph showing the carnage, "taken by a French secret observer then in Moscow who hid the plate under a carpet," etc. In short, the lie with circumstance—for the photograph was what the Tribune in an obscure item of correction calls "a street scene" in Petrograd, during the revolution of 1917, and has appeared both in Professor Ross's book on The Russian Revolution and in a contemporary number of the Tribune itself. "Lies, lies again, and still they lie!"

IT is terrible to think that there are over 100,000 prisoners of war still to be repatriated. Will the third anniversary of the armistice see the last of these men in their homes? The League of Nations commission has already helped 400,000 of them to get back. This work, under the able direction of Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, has been carried on in the face of great obstacles. Most of those prisoners who were spared by disease and civil war have been slowly and painfully trickling out, to Vladivostok and round by ship, or overland through the Baltic and the Black Sea, in a dismal Odyssey which people who value their comfort of mind will not choose to picture to themselves.

THE Allies by deciding to "maintain an attitude of strict neutrality in the Greco-Turkish war" have shown how far back toward normalcy the world has slid since the bright days when the League of Nations was founded on the basis that anybody's quarrel is the world's business. The Treaty of Sèvres no longer officially exists, and since no greater power is guaranteeing for Greece any of her benefits under that treaty, she may go ahead and take what she can. The Powers, disgusted with the many difficulties of settling this quarrel, and disagreeing among themselves, stand aloof, while this miserable little war, without the slightest idealistic pretence, but with wholesale atrocities, on each side, burns itself out.

NEWSPAPER reports have spread commonly the impression that the German workmen have longer hours and lower pay than workmen of other countries. The lesson normally drawn from this supposition is double edged: Germany can pay all the reparations demanded of her, and if we are to compete with her, our workmen too must have less pay and longer hours. A writer in the London Economist helps to destroy this popular myth. The average German works eight hours a day—seven in the coal mines, he says. Measured in real wages —as distinguished from nominal and gold wages —he remarks, German wages are about thirty per cent higher than before the war. And the wage movement is upward, not downward. As for reparations, here is the Economist's opinion: "... it is not easy to see how reparations payments can be made unless the German workman does consent to work long hours for low wages; the difficulty is that (he) shows no consciousness of the necessity."

MARSHAL FOCH is to visit Poland in September in order to arouse, says a despatch to the World, "a high Polish patriotic feeling to counteract the growing discontent with the inefficiency of the government." We hope the Poles, hesitating between the feelings of indignation and amusement which such news may arouse in them, will choose the latter. But probably neither they nor the French will see the humor of proposing a patriotic drive as a better remedy for popular impatience than an increase of efficiency. In this incident, too, can be seen a contrast between two continents: towards the cure of Poland's chaos America has contributed an economic adviser and an expert untangler of railroads, while France will send a hero with a baton and five stars on his sleeve. If Marshal Foch's mission has any success, it might lead to the creation of a useful bureau of the League of Nations: a sort of international Yale Spirit bureau which would send out military Billy Sundays to hold patriotic revival meetings among grumbling peoples.

ONE may suppose that the United States will continue to govern the Philippines indefinitely, or that it will try to make them ready for independence as soon as possible. On neither supposition does the choice of General Wood as Governor seem to us wise. The general's good points are that he can hammer order out of an administrative mess, that he knows exactly what he wants, and has the force of character that secures obedience. We hold that other qualities should be foremost in a governor of the Philippines: tact, the capacity to understand an alien race, to make allowances for their disabili-

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ties, an appreciation of the state of mind of one people ruled by another superior to it in "efficiency"; and we believe that General Wood lacks these qualities completely. At best, this delicate problem should be submitted to no professional soldier, but—even among military men—General Wood is peculiarly blunt-minded. His rule will be honest and it may be efficient, but it will be the rule of the heavy hand and the heavy mind.

REPRESENTATIVE FREAR of Wisconsin is justified in waxing indignant at the attempt of Secretaries Weeks and Denby to sanctify a monopoly in the dye stuff industry on the score of its necessity for the national defense. If it is necessary to exclude foreign competition in any industry on such grounds the industry itself should either be operated by the government or else subjected to rigid government supervision as to prices and quality of product. As a matter of fact, however, it is no more necessary to shut out foreign dyes, because of the importance of chemical compounds in modern warfare than it is to shut out foreign steel, because of the importance of finished steel goods in modern warfare. It would be a deplorable mistake to give a privileged position to any American industry on such a dubious and flimsy pretext. If the Republican leaders stand for it, they will be subordinating the domestic policy of the government to an irresponsible and dangerous militarism.

PERHAPS Mayor Hylan can name, quickly and accurately, the capitals of the seven smallest states, the names of the White House dogs, the chief products of Zanzibar. But his showing when questioned on points of New York City finance that should be "general information" to the average Mayor, raises the strongest doubts of his ability to pass any test of knowledge. Mr. Edison would mark him "XYZ." Most of his answers were of this order: "I couldn't repeat it word for word. . . . I am not supposed to be familiar with the details. . . . Yes, as I remember it. . . . I have read a great many sections of the (city) charter. . . . The sinking fund to pay the interest on the city debt is a sinking fund to pay the interest on the city debt." While pure ignorance prompted most of such answers, there was obviously not a little calculated evasion, expressed in his fear of "trick or catch" questions. The Mayor might just as well have borrowed the tactics of evasion used by James A. Stillman, who replied to nearly all questions with the formula "I refuse to answer on the ground that it might tend to incriminate me."

CAN America be made moral by censorship? The proof that this is the firm faith of large groups of Americans is to be found in the increasing strenuous activity of state censorship boards. The efforts of these state boards sweating over every inch of film and snipping away this kiss and that cigarette, this bit of mixed bathing and that bit of child-birth, are a complete testimony to the pious belief, now enforced on the state of New York, that a moral America can best be secured by giving people the kinds of facts that are good for them and swatting every other kind. It is a well-meant policy, but it is extremely difficult to keep facts swatted when any real desire is behind them. The shipment of the Dempsey-Carpentier fight pictures into New York is a sign of this. In spite of a federal law and an actual fine in court, Mr. Rickard and his associates are showing the pictures in a New York theatre, on the grotesque theory that Mr. Rickard purchased immunity when he paid his fine. What gives him immunity is not, of course, his paying of a fine. It is the sanction of an opinion which censorship does not reach by its crude policy of removing the opportunity while leaving the desire.

## The Road to Irish Peace

BY one of those accidents which occur to statesmen, a copy of the letter addressed by General Smuts to de Valera appears to have been given by Smuts to Lloyd George and from Lloyd George to have passed innocently to the press. In virtue of this misadventure, not yet explained, the silence that has surrounded the Irish negotiations has at any rate been shattered and at this crucial stage the world is allowed to see the deadlock as it actually exists.

It is, as The New Republic surmised, a deadlock on the attitude of the British government in regard to N. E. Ulster. The British government has given up all claims whatever to keep the south of Ireland as an administrative area. Complete "home rule," with everything that this implies in regard to taxation, finance, personnel, is no longer under debate. The arrangements which in 1918 seemed unthinkable to Lloyd George at the time of the Irish Convention have now been admitted as fundamental necessities of self-rule. So far, at least, in spite of high obstacles of mind and habit, the negotiations between the two nations have progressed. Not only is the Union gone as an administrative but as a political and moral conception. The attempt to compel the Irish people into a new,

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federated system of the United Kingdom has also been abandoned. It is still possible for Lloyd George to say, from the lips out, that Great Britain and Ireland form "the heart of the commonwealth." But he knows, and we know, that these words are not true. The heart of the commonwealth is Britain. Ireland as yet forms no part of it except in fancy and aspiration.

The original proposals from Lloyd George to de Valera do, however, retain one conception that was predominant in Lloyd George's mind in 1918: that N. E. Ulster is to be partitioned off from the rest of Ireland in accordance with the wishes of the Unionist majority, and that "dominion status" does not mean dominion status for the whole of Ireland, but dominion home rule for that part of Ireland which Sir Edward Carson's dividing line left out of the Northern area. The onus of "unity" is thrown wholly and solely on Sinn Fein Ireland, with N. E. Ulster assured that its entrenched powers and privileges cannot be abrogated.

The New Republic has argued that the Unionist majority in N. E. Ulster should not be forced to come in to a Sinn Fein Republic, and that de Valera could never expect the support of liberal opinion if he took up this position. The New Republic, on the other hand, has maintained that if Sinn Fein could be brought to consent to accept dominion status, there was no more reason why N. E. Ulster should be given independence of the rest of Ireland than that the Boers should be given independence of the rest of South Africa, or French Canadians independence of the rest of Canada. For the British government to decree the break-up of Ireland in obedience to a political minority has seemed to us uncandid and unprincipled.

It is now clear that de Valera, with the consent of his colleagues, stands ready to negotiate a treaty by which Ireland should remain within the British empire. This is the live-and-let-live offer to the British government which liberal opinion demands. "A certain treaty-free association with the British commonwealth group, as with a partial League of Nations, we would have been ready to recommend and as a government to negotiate and take responsibility for, had we assurance that entry of the nation as a whole into such association would secure for it the allegiance of the present dissenting minority, to meet whose sentiment alone this step would be contemplated."

The British answer to this offer is what? The assurance that N. E. Ulster is an immovable body to which the British government must defer. The effect of this assertion is to force Sinn Fein Ireland either to believe this absurdity or to conclude that there is no hope in negotiating with an Empire which does not possess the power to deliver the goods. As a matter of fact, de Valera has taken up the impregnable position that if the British government will not deal with the dissenting minority in the interests of a dominion, Ireland should be allowed to deal with that dissenting minority in the interests of a Republic. It will deal with N. E. Ulster not by force of arms but by force of principle and ideas, offering N. E. Ulster impartial arbitration, "external arbitration."

The proposal of external arbitration has produced in the British government that instinctive reaction with which we are only too familiar in the politics of power. There is, first of all, the profoundly immoral argument that Britain cannot consider on its merits a problem that bears on "the freedom" (that is to say, the domination) "of the great sea routes." Secondly, there is the sophistry that "great numbers in all the Irish provinces are profoundly attached to the throne." This is an hallucination. Thirdly, there is the flat assertion that "the British government cannot consent . . . to the arbitration of a foreign power. We cannot agree to refer the question of your relations with Northern Ireland to foreign arbitration."

To fling away an Irish settlement with this stiff assertion of arbitrary will seems to us fundamentally impossible. Had de Valera taken up an incorrigibly nationalistic position in regard to N. E. Ulster, the New Republic could not have defended his attitude, much as we have deplored the wholesale use of British troops in Ireland. But with the Irish Cabinet ready to pledge itself to a status within the Empire for all Ireland, and eager now to present the issue to "external arbitration," it seems to us that humanity and sincerity both alike demand that the negotiations be continued.

If the negotiations are closed, and if General Tudor and General Macready are re-employed to break down the manhood of Ireland, the reverberations of this decision will be heard for many years and in every corner of the world. It is at moments like these that the conscience of great states is tested. Is the British Empire to "resolve to resist with full power" the broad offer of the Irish people, and to bear down on them with the heavy mace of imperialism, or are the British Commonwealths to speak and demand that Ireland, all Ireland, be admitted into their "partial League of Nations?" This is a decision as between freedom and domination, the exercise of principle or the drunken appeal to force. In this cause, in which she is an interested party, must Britain insist on being the judge? This is the moral issue that de Valera has presented to the statesmanship not merely of Lloyd George but of the English-speaking world.

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# An Open Season for Governors

THE flight of Len Small, Governor of Illinois, from the sheriff armed with a warrant for his arrest on the charge of embezzling interest on public funds while he was state treasurer, reached a tame and impotent conclusion when bad roads forced the executive to return to Springfield and submit as gracefully as might be to the law which he had taken his oath to support. The whole episode is worthy of American state politics and of comic opera. It convinces one that Gilbert and Sullivan should have written the classic exposition of our democracy rather than Viscount Bryce. It would at least have been less dreary. Whether Governor Small is technically guilty or not he has certainly made something out of his disinterested service of his fellow citizens. Starting with the state asylum for the insane at Kankakee as his political fief he has imitated the earlier Hohenzollerns, adding bit by bit to his holdings and ambitions until he reached the state treasurership.

Why men want to be state treasurer is fairly well known in Illinois, and Len Small was never supposed to be above the common run of humanity. At all events, as a condition of his candidacy for governor he returned a large sum to the state treasury and said that it was all. But his downfall is not due to a wave of repentance and reform on the part of his constituency. Like his prototype William Sulzer, he is the victim of a political feud. When the Thompson-Lundin machine last fall proposed to capitalize the Republican landslide and extend its power from the city of Chicago to the state of Illinois it chose Len Small as its standard bearer. In consequence Small became the shining and easy mark for all of Mayor Thompson's political foes, in particular the two great Chicago newspapers, The Tribune and The Daily News, Senator Medill McCormick, and Attorney General Brundage. They went out to get Len Small. They got him.

Governor Small objected to the enforcement of the law in his case not because it affected Len Small, but because it was a derogation of the dignity of what is commonly referred to as the Great State of Illinois. In this we think he is subject to a fallacy somewhat prevalent among democratic statesmen. We believe that the commonwealth would have been honored by the conduct of its chief magistrate in scrupulously avoiding the appearance of taking any advantage of the law's delay, in standing his trial at once in the place where his alleged crime was committed, and in proceeding at once to do his time like any good citizen. Instead of this example of civic virtue we have the usual comedy of avoidance of summons, flight by night, a scurry through the state with an automobile fitted up as the executive office—and we shall have the long legal wrangle which may easily last until Governor Small's term is over, and no one but himself the better for his punishment.

It would be no real injury to the state to be governed from prison—rather an advantage. There is a county in the state of Missouri which because of the refusal of the commissioners to make a tax levy to pay interest on bonds, is in perpetual contempt of the Federal Court, and in consequence the commissioners as soon as elected repair to jail, take the oath of office there, and serve their term. The county has found great advantages in this procedure. For one thing the commissioners are always on the job; they can be found and assembled promptly at any hour, day or night. Their whole time is at the disposal of the public; and under observation as they are they find it difficult or impossible to promote those official enterprises in which common welfare is adulterated by private profit.

Altogether prison as a seat of government has great advantages in a democracy, and we could wish no better fate for the Great State of Illinois than that its governor should speedily take up his residence there. But government under indictment is perhaps a second best. The city of San Francisco is said to have had the best municipal administration in its history when most of its officers headed by the mayor were thus in jeopardy. The plan of indicting officers on their election is one which we commend to associations directed to the improvement of local and national government. If it is objected that every man is entitled to a presumption of innocence, we reply: not the political officeholder; and certainly not when he has been state treasurer. Besides, it is a safe and strong probability that every man has been a law breaker—especially since the Volstead Act, the Mann Act, and the Espionage Act have diffused the function of crime. Such active citizens as John S. Sumner and Archibald Stevenson could easily get something on every man elected to office: their influence with grand juries would secure the indictment; and the serving of the warrant and acceptance of bonds might be an appropriate part of the inauguration ceremonial.

So, although we are not altogether optimistic about seeing Governor Len Small in prison, we are cheered by the fact that he is under indictment for something, and in consequence we prophesy a better four years than could otherwise have been expected for the Great State of Illinois.

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# Representative Government on the Railroads

IN the history of American transportation, railway operators and managers have from one period to another appeared in many striking and varied roles. It remained, however, for the officers of the Pennsylvania and Long Island Railroad Companies to assume in the year 1921 the role of sponsors of a new machinery of democratic political organization. The circumstances which led busy railroad men into this new, and apparently alien, field of activity are interesting enough to deserve restatement at this time.

During the period of Federal control, the relations between the railroads and their employees were fixed in a series of contracts, known as "National Agreements," existing between the Director General of Railroads and the organizations of employees of specific carriers. On April 14, 1921, the Railroad Labor Board ordered the termination of these agreements by July 1, 1921, and required the carriers and their employees to designate representatives authorized to negotiate new rules and working conditions.

To carry out the mandate of the Labor Board, the first step was naturally the choice of accredited representatives by the interested parties—the railroads and their employees. For the carriers the choice was easy and automatic, but for the employees the naming of representatives was soon found to be involved in considerable difficulty. How this difficulty arose and is now being resolved through the good offices of the Labor Board is clearly indicated in the three complaints against the Pennsylvania and Long Island Railroads, recently heard by the Labor Board.

The first complaint was made by the Federated Shop Crafts of the Pennsylvania System. Shop employees on the Pennsylvania System, who are members of System Federation No. 90 of the Railway Employees Department of the American Federation of Labor, met and elected their chairmen to represent them in joint conference with the railroads. These officers of the employees' union entered into conference with the representatives of the carriers on May 24, 1921, and there stated that they were acting for the majority of the employees in the shop crafts on the Pennsylvania System. The railroad officials contended that there was no satisfactory proof that the System Federation really represented a majority of the employees, and therefore proposed to collect proof by preparing a ballot on which all shop craft employees should designate their representatives. To this ballot the System Federation raised three important objections—(1) that it did not permit employees to vote for an organization; (2) that the individuals designated on the ballot must be employees of the carrier; and (3) that the ballot required that employees be represented regionally rather than from the system as a whole. The carriers refused to yield to these objections and two independent elections were held, one under the auspices of the carriers and one under that of System Federation No. 90. With those persons named by their own election, the carriers proceeded to negotiate revisions in working rules on the Pennsylvania System.

How completely the persons so elected represented the employees of the railroad is suggested in the following finding of fact made by the Labor Board:

> ". . . As a consequence of the failure of the parties to agree upon a method of holding an election, the employees have so far been denied their legal right to select their representatives for this important conference on rules. As evidence of the fact that no real test of the choice of the employees has been had, the carrier in its own presentation to this Board admits that, exclusive of the Altoona Shops, only 3,480 men voted, out of 33,104 entitled to vote, for the alleged representatives who are negotiating rules. In other words, only 10.5 per cent of these employees are represented in these negotiations, and 89.5 per cent are virtually disfranchised. . ."

The facts in the second complaint against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company are substantially like those in the first, except that the complaint was this time made by another union of employees, the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees. The case derives additional interest, however, from the greater detail in which the Board presents evidence concerning the nature of the election conducted by the Pennsylvania Railroad.

> "The evidence shows," the Board reports, "that a large majority of said employees either did not participate in the election held by the carrier, or their votes were thrown out by the carrier. The representatives selected by a minority of the employees in question have since been negotiating new agreements for rules and working conditions, to apply to all employees of that class, including the majority who did not vote or whose votes were cast out."
>
> "On the Akron Division, Central Region, where there were 172 clerks, the committeemen selected in the election held by the carrier received respectively 5, 5, and 4 votes."
>
> "On the Eastern Division, Central Region, out of 750 eligible clerical votes, the committeemen that the carrier declared elected, received respectively 94, 65, and 61 votes."
>
> "On the Baltimore Division, Eastern Region, 414 votes were cast for the Brotherhood of Railway and

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Steamship Clerks, etc. These votes were thrown out and a committeeman declared elected who received 28 votes."

Other instances of the same kind are cited. And the Board summarizes this evidence with the remark that "The foregoing statements of facts and figures relative to said election are expressly admitted in detail by the carrier."

In its discussion of this last case, the Board stated its unwillingness to "enter into the motives of the parties." But to those who are curious on this point, the facts in the third case, Federated Shop Crafts vs. The Long Island Railroad Company, may give much light. On May 3, 1921, the superintendent of motive power in the Long Island Shops asked the shop crafts to name their representatives for conference with the railroad company. The carrier was notified by letter on May 10th that the six shop crafts had designated the officers of System Federation No. 90 for this purpose. But the carrier was still not satisfied, so a Mr. Bishop "was instructed immediately to take a poll to determine what the majority of the employees desire." This poll was taken with the result that 98 per cent of the employees voted for System Federation No. 90. Under ordinary conditions the matter would have been closed at this point. The carrier discovered a new principle, however. It found that it could negotiate only with its "direct employees" and therefore declined to enter into conference with the officers of System Federation No. 90. Why this sudden adoption of a new principle? The answer to this query is contained in the statement made to the Board by the General Superintendent:

> 'We were sanguine when that first letter was written, that our employees would not count upon System Federation No. 90 to represent them. . . . Our expectations in that respect were destroyed.'

Out of this frustrated hope, then, grew the plan for a new election which resulted in bringing the situation before the Railroad Labor Board.

Acting on the evidence, with proper appreciation of the spirit of the Transportation Act of 1920 and the practical status of railway labor unions, the Labor Board drew its decisions with refreshing directness and simplicity. It held both the carriers and the employees culpable for impeding the prompt and fair settlement of working arrangements. It ordered a new election, under conditions specified in detail. It recognized the right of the employees to vote for an organization and to have the names of organizations appear on the ballot. Representatives of the workers, it found, need not be "direct employees" of the carrier. "The railway employees," it said, "have built up organizations with their money, have put at the head of them men they consider most competent and trustworthy, and have acquired a vast amount of information, statistical and general, bearing on matters affecting their rules and working conditions. It is unjust and unreasonable to seek . . . to deprive them of the efficient representation afforded by these organizations. . . ." And it deplored the attempt of the carriers to adopt regional representation, with the observation that such a practice might "easily degenerate into the process known in politics as gerrymandering."

For a time it seemed that the officials of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company would refuse to abide by the decision of the Board and the air was filled with threats of strike from the shop employees. Later reports, however, indicate that the officials have reconsidered and are preparing to confer with their workers over the provisions for new elections.

In these, as well as in some of its earlier decisions the Railroad Labor Board has enunciated with intelligence and with courage the principles which should govern the relations between employees and management on American railroads. At times railroad managers have acted as if the passing of the Railroad Administration was the signal for an attack on the railroad unions and for their destruction. Yet for more than a year, throughout the difficult period of an industrial depression, the Board has helped to preserve the integrity of these unions and has thus paved the way for the maintenance of a system of successful industrial relations, at a time when such relations are beset with unusual difficulties. What is still sorely needed in the situation is an informed public opinion willing to lend vigorous support in the future to decisions like those which the Board has made in the past.

## America and Russia

THE New Republic has been frequently accused of Bolshevism. If by this it is pretended that it has advocated Marxian Socialism or the dictatorship of the proletariat as a remedy for social ills in this or any other country the charge is absurdly untrue. It is true, however, that the New Republic has regarded the social experiment undertaken in Russia as one of extreme interest and value to political science, and has endeavored to give its readers the fullest and most authoritative information in regard to it. It is true that the New Republic has steadily deprecated external interference with that experiment, first on the ground that by such interference the results whether favorable or unfavorable to the theory

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would be rendered inconclusive; and second on the ground that such interference was a violation of the rights of the Russian people and an inhuman aggravation of their sufferings. It is true that it has opposed the sending of armies of invasion into Russia, the aid accorded through the Red Cross and other means to such futile rebellions as those of Kolchak, Denikine, Yudenich, and Wrangel, the economic boycott, by which Russia was deprived of food, machinery and medicine, the continued recognition of Bakhmetiev as representative of Russia and the deportation of Martens. It has protested in the name and for the sake of the American public against the foolish and misleading propaganda of papers like the New York Times. It has held steadily that the economic collapse of Russia was due primarily to the misgovernment of the Tsars and the war, and that the present government was the only one that could in any manner grapple wth the immediate situation. It has repeatedly defended the Soviet government against a campaign of misrepresentation and falsehood, without denying any of the charges that have been proved true or palliating errors that have become evident. Above all it has insisted that the friendship between Russia and America should be maintained in spite of political differences, and that our failure to do this was the greatest and most tragic falling away from the ideal of a world comity of peoples which we professed and in the name of which we entered the war.

It is the last point which demands reassertion at the present time. The history of American-Russian relations for the last four years should be recalled only as an appeal to the Americon conscience, a call to repentance because of the instant need of fruits meet for repentance. The Russian famine gives an occasion for the reapproach of the two peoples, for the releasing of those forces of mutual good-will which make for reconstruction. In aiding Russia, the American people have not only the immediate privilege of saving from suffering and death some millions of fellow human beings. They have the opportunity of blotting out the results of error and prejudice, and reestablishing a spiritual accord and a material reciprocation which will be the greatest factor in the economic rehabilitation of the world. It would be superfluous to point out the imperious necessity of the participation of Russia in any plan for restoring the world to a condition of self-support. It would be equally superfluous to point out how the over-development of American productive apparatus and the under-development of Russian resources naturally supplement each other. America has the food, the machinery, the engineers, the ships; Russia has the soil, the raw material, the workers. No two countries in the world are naturally in such position to reenforce each other without political antagonism. The present difference between them is overwhelmingly a matter of misunderstanding and miscalculation on both sides, of the arrogant claim of each government to interfere in the social problems of the other. On the part of proletarian Russia such an attempt was so impotent that it might well have been disregarded; on the part of America its futility has been amply proved. The destructive forces have done their work, and the ground is cleared for building. The exigency of the famine should accelerate the advancing hour.

The Soviet government has proceeded rapidly in fulfilling the conditions laid down by the American Relief Administration. The Americans under detention have been released, and apparently every disposition is shown to accept the arrangement laid down by Mr. Hoover for the benevolent penetration of Russia. Undoubtedly difficulties and misunderstandings will arise. It is not to be expected that the Soviet government will abdicate its functions in favor of Mr. Hoover's organization as was so largely the case in the twenty-three other countries in which relief was afforded under the same conditions. The situation will demand tact, conciliation, and generosity on the part of Mr. Hoover and his aides, and these qualities we confidently expect will be shown.

Mr. Hoover has three sets of difficulties to overcome. There is the inevitable suspicion on the part of the Russian government that the power of American food will be used politically to undermine its authority. There is a corresponding belief among those in this country most inclined to sympathize and help, that Mr. Hoover will play the game so boastfully credited to him in the case of Hungary. We frankly believe that both fears are unfounded. The lesson of Hungary cannot have been entirely lost on Mr. Hoover. He could overthrow Bela Kun, but he could not avert the Rumanian sack or the white terror. In the case of Russia, to cut the cloth without the power of sewing it up again would be far more fatal. Finally there is the stupid apathy and cruel malevolence, carefully cultivated in the American people, which would sacrifice millions of the innocent and the helpless as a rebuke to the theory, or revenge for the practice, of a heretical government. It is in combatting this attitude that Mr. Hoover will find his chief task. And it is a necessary one. The Society of Friends is already actively in the field of relief, supported by numerous organizations which have been tolerant toward Russia in the past. The immediate response of intelligence and sympathy

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which have not been perverted by propaganda will flow in increased volume through these channels. But the situation is beyond the resources of these outstanding groups. Both by virtue of the need and the opportunity it calls for a general movement, a levée en masse of the forces of charity and good will of the whole nation. And this is possible only with the countenance of the American government, under the leadership of an official representative such as Mr. Hoover.

## "A Degrading Topic"

SIR: The caption "A Protest Against Prize Fighting" placed over Sarah J. Eddy's letter in the issue of August 3, 1921, is as intentionally misleading as any that the yellow press is capable of using. The letter in question is not a protest, in particular of prize-fighting, but it is a protest against the *publication* of articles by the New Republic on so degrading a topic. It would seem to the regular reader of a magazine of the nature of the New Republic, that it is a waste of space to so use its pages. The daily press regaled itself voluminously and exhaustively on all phases of the combat, and there was no demand for anything further from the New Republic.

Miss Eddy is not the only reader disappointed in two articles devoted to the fighters and the fight.

Yours truly,

LILLIAN A. GARING.

Elmhurst, L. I., New York City

THE New Republic, it would seem, was wrong to print an article on "so degrading a topic" as a prize-fight! The writer of the above letter not only thinks so, but thinks that the mere statement of her point of view is sufficient, and that our heading on the Eddy letter must have been intentionally misleading—we, apparently, being already in our hearts so convicted of degradation and sin as to be driven to hypocrisy and falsification.

The Eddy caption, we regretfully admit, was careless and inaccurate. So far we plead guilty. But to call the caption "intentionally misleading" would be possible only to a reader who totally, though no doubt unintentionally, misunderstands and perverts our point of view.

That point of view includes, or aims to include, the world as it exists. It is based on the belief that our readers agree with us that free vision, not ignorance, is the basis of sound comprehension and indeed morality; and that the feebler kind of idealism is the idealism which insists on ignoring a topic simply because it considers a topic degrading. All facts, of course, do not edify. Because edification is so much desired by so many timid and apprehensive people, innumerable editors mill their facts to an elegant whiteness just as the flour-makers mill their flour ineffably white. But we think that this is really a meagre kind of refinement. To draw aside one's skirts from a reality on the ground that it is distateful or unedifying is not the mode in which a true picture of the world can be formed. It is too naïve. In so far as it succeeds, it creates a precarious and self-deceiving happiness, a fool's paradise. That is not the kind of world in which we should want ourselves or our readers to live.

The Dempsey-Carpentier fight was reported in the New Republic not for edification but for veracity. The spectacle was not, we believe, represented as edifying. It was simply described. This in no way precludes our view that the world-wide interest in the fight was in the main the most striking recent example of the extraordinary suggestibility of the public and the shrewd guidance of herd instinct by the promoters, the special writers and the press. We do not believe that prize-fighting is a high form of sport and we do not intend to run a prize-fight department. But the fact that our interest in the world is serious and critical will not exclude from our columns the events of major popular interest. Particularly on those events we cannot give ourselves up to the pastime of moralizing a priori. The Dempsey-Carpentier fight was, we believe, a secular event sufficiently occupying to warrant an actual description. If that description did not meet the facts, it deserves to be criticized, but to exclude the description of a public event of immense human interest on the ground that our readers are too refined to endure such vulgarity would seem to us to be merely priggish.

It is not topics that are degrading, we contend, but certain banal modes of treating them. For ourselves, we consider that we should seek to hold the actual world in full and rounded view. The one thing we cannot seek is to keep approval on condition we regard ourselves as too elevated to touch human, all-too-human, facts.

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# The Better Prospect

I

CHEERLESS as is the atmosphere of opinion in America just at present it is not so utterly cheerless as the atmosphere in Europe. The European peoples are emotionally depressed; they are intellectually confused; they are morally sceptical and undecided. Both the victors and the vanquished nations are facing as the result of the war ominous economic problems which they do not sufficiently understand and about which they cannot make up their minds what to do. They have not reached any consensus of opinion either as to the nature of their complaint or as to the direction in which they must look for alleviation. They answer its immediate demands with temporary expedients which at best postpone what appears to be inevitable bankruptcy. Yet although they do not know what to do, they must before long do something remedial. When they have to act, they will need a kind of knowledge and an amount of self-possession which they are as yet far from attaining.

This is a tolerably gloomy description of the situation in Europe, but I am not writing it with any intention of characterizing the European predicament as more hopeless or even more gloomy than it has been. On the contrary in spite of the depression, confusion and uncertainty, to a certain extent even because of this state of mind, the atmosphere of opinion in Europe is more wholesome than it was a year ago. In one essential respect it has improved and is still improving. The fugitive prosperity and the false optimism of some of the European peoples have come to an end, and by ending, they have finally exposed the full intensity of the war and post-war financial insanity and economic disability. This keener consciousness of the size of the problem and its irretrievability, even though it assumes the shape of depression, confusion and uncertainty, has more vitality and more promise than the alternating illusions of fear and hope that preceded it. There are, I think, sound reasons for anticipating a gradual turn of the tide and the tentative start of a process of physical and moral recuperation.

Since August 1914 the minds of all the belligerent nations passed through successive spasms of morbid apprehension and no less morbid exhilaration. As long as the fighting lasted a feverish hope of victory alternated with a haunting fear of defeat, victory being associated with many illusory benefits and defeat with many illusory calamities. After the fighting ceased this apocalyptic state of mind continued. As a compensation for the misery and the inhumanity of the black years, millions of men and women dreamed that the drama of war would somehow end with a deliriously happy last act, which would transfigure it from a tragedy of international chaos and hatred into a Divine Comedy of peace and reconciliation. When Versailles disappointed these hopes many good people jumped to the opposite extreme and anticipated the early advent of revolutionary chaos. Their state of mind continued to be apocalyptic. They were in a mood to demand enormous profits on their recent emotional investment in social salvation. The anticipations of the enthusiasts who expected some miraculous transfiguration of man and society intensified the fears of the numerous and powerful class which feared that, if humanity had started on a march toward some new frontier, it might have to destroy or abandon as unnecessary encumbrances too large a part of its hard-won endowment of social fixtures. Conservatives either by temperament or conviction closed their minds to the need and nature of remedial changes. They were thrown into a panic by the revolutionary fermentation and by the apocalyptic prophecies of the early advent of the Kingdom of God on earth.

The prevailing depression, confusion and uncertainty have certain clear advantages over his preceding state of mind. The credulity, the pugnacity and the emotional instability of the war psychology are passing. The generous hopes of the early coming of a new and better social order have disappeared, but their disappearance is not a total loss. They created among conservatives an acute dread of violent and revolutionary change which closed their minds against remedial social discussion and action. As long as it looked as if western democracy was actually getting underway for an irresistible and disorderly forward movement towards some visionary goal, those who did not want progress at the expense of order would not cooperate to accomplish those changes the need of which was demonstrable to humane and candid people. Depressed, confused, sceptical and even cynical as the present state of mind is, it is also disillusioned. It had to be disillusioned both of its hopes and fears before the conservative ruling classes would face the realities of the existing problems.

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## II

If the credulous and quarrelsome extravagance of war psychology is really passing, the most formidable obstacles to recuperation are passing with it, and prophetic symptoms of better times and better things are already appearing. Up to the present they are negative rather than positive. They consist chiefly in the almost uninterrupted ill-success of the more dangerous conspiracies against the popular welfare which the fanatics either of conservatism or radicalism have attempted. But they are none the less important and significant for being negative. They testify to the stubborn vitality of a half-conscious social commonsense which, in spite of the prevailing confusion and cynicism, is still vigorous enough to neutralize the more obvious attempts to continue the use of violence as the one trustworthy instrument of political and social policy.

Since the fighting ended, force exercised for defensive purposes has usually been successful, but for offensive purposes almost always impotent. The Allied governments failed to overthrow the Communist government of Russia by the pressure of military and economic coercion. Yet the Soviets, which were impregnable on the defensive, proved to be absurdly weak as soon as they took advantage of their victory to attack Poland. In Germany both the Reds and the Whites, in spite of the infirmity of the new republican government, failed in revolutionary conspiracies to seize the state. Italy is seared with local and spasmodic violence. Organized society seems to be as inept as it is in Germany, but somehow it survives and is apparently gradually suffocating its adversaries. French opinion is less intransigeant than the politicians and the journalists make it out to be. France disposes of overwhelming military power. She claims to cherish colossal grievances against Germany which justify her in exacting the most extreme penalties. She threatens and fulminates, but when the time for action comes she at least hesitates. She does not break away from her former Allies and take the irrevocably disastrous step of occupying with her army the German military and manufacturing district. In Ireland Sinn Fein has vindicated Irish nationality against British coercion, but it has not won complete independence by revolution and it is unable to do so. The present negotiations in Ireland are the result of the deadlock of force, not of its supremacy.

Thus the war, if it has not brought with it any of the radical improvements in international organization and social practice which were at one time anticipated, has not as yet brought about any of those irretrievable subsequent calamities which, should they occur, would reduce the other European peoples to something like the condition of the Russians. Of course they are not immune nor anything like it. Any one of a dozen different political and economic strains may, if it gets out of hand, restore with disastrous results the temporary supremacy of violence. But there is reason for hope. These very strains counteract one another. The perverted moral-conviction which tempts fanatics to successful enterprises of violence is failing. The fires have died down. The vast majority of people in Europe and America want most of all the opportunity to cultivate their gardens.

This they are beginning to do. In spite of many grievous obstacles, in spite of a temporary setback at the present moment, the general tendency is towards economic recuperation. Except in Russia, the fear of starvation which was the chief excuse for the social instability in Europe has passed. The Hoover relief organization is continuing to feed millions in Poland and Austria, but elsewhere in Europe, Russia excepted, the local communities became self-supporting sooner than was expected. This increased production of food, attended on the Continent by some revival of industry, is still accompanied by business depression and unemployment particularly on the part of the maritime peoples of Britain and America; but their former prosperity was born of the famine in Continental Europe, and their peoples are now unemployed in part as the result of the recuperation on the Continent. While the recuperation is still no more than sufficient to do away with the threat of starvation and while it leaves the European peoples depressed, confused and sceptical, it does reenforce the feeling of social stability. When the masses no longer fear actual starvation and the ruling classes are secure for the time being against a communist revolution, they may focus their minds with some chance of success upon the work of economic and social reconstruction.

## III

Will social reconstruction actually follow? Can the discouraged, forlorn, confused and sceptical peoples of Europe by wise management extricate themselves from their colossal entanglements and recover the amount of well-being which they automatically enjoyed before the war? Or will they gradually succumb to the load of their disabilities and allow the continent of Europe slowly to deteriorate as a human habitation until it returns in the number and the welfare of its inhabitants to the standards of the 18th century?

I shall not try to answer these questions, but I

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shall try to outline the conditions under which recovery is likely to take place, if at all. These conditions are, I think, paradoxical. They point towards the carrying out of radically reconstructive programs by conservative governments. A prosperous Europe will have to modify essentially many of the institutions and practices, both economic and political, which were accepted before the war and to which its rulers are still proposing to return. The old political and economic nationalism will not work unless it is much better behaved. But if these ameliorations are to come about in the near future, statesmen will have to make them who disapprove of them as a matter of conviction, but who will be forced both as opportunistic politicians and in some instances as public-spirited leaders to violate their own prejudices and principles for the demonstrable benefit of their fellow-countrymen. They will themselves propose and carry out political and social changes which, if and when initiated by their opponents, they would condemn as subversive of social order.

During the war progressives all over the world, but particularly in Great Britain and this country, jumped to the conclusion that, given a world in which radical social changes were destined to occur, they would be appointed to bring them about. This idea, it is now clear, was an illusion. They were right in divining the need and foreseeing the coming of these changes, but they were wrong in expecting that they would be undertaken by conscious progressives. The changes will not take place because an enlightened and prepared majority of public opinion demands them and knows how to bring them about. They will take place under constraint. The breakdown which necessitated the changes has come suddenly and prematurely. It has caught progressives as well as conservatives unprepared. They do not possess the political maturity or the personal authority or the social knowledge which they need to assume successfully the reins of government. If they are wise they will recognize their own infirmities.

When a political and social system brings so much suffering on mankind and proves to be so blundering and so inhumane, it seems unjust and inexplicable that its beneficiaries and advocates should retain their leadership. But they will remain in power and their continued ascendancy is neither unjust nor inexplicable. There is not a nation in the world today in which the radical opposition is capable of assuming the responsibilities of government and actually carrying out with popular consent a policy of social reconstruction. They do not know how. They lack the necessary equipment in method and personnel. They can not count on any sufficient or sustained support from an educated popular opinion. These statements are manifestly true of this country, in which progressivism is wanting entirely in integrity, in a common program and in effective organized power. For the present and probably for some time to come there is no realistic alternative to rule by the Republican party. But something analogous is true of Great Britain. Progressives all over the world have looked to the British Labor Party as the most mature and competent embodiment of social democracy which seeks expression through partizan political agitation and organization. So it is. But it is still far from presenting a practical alternative to the older parties as an effective governing body. It has an intelligent program, but its membership is not sufficiently conscious of its own purposes and sufficiently united in their support to carry its program through. If this is true of the British Labor Party, it is still more true of the socialist and labor groups on the continent.

The critics and adversaries of the existing social organization are not at present competent to provide a substitute for it. Little as the old ruling classes may deserve a new lease of power, they will get it as a result of a default by their radical opponents. They are more representative than are the progressives of the practice, the disposition and standards of a democratic society which, like that of today, is rendered intellectually and morally stagnant as the result of the actuation of its members chiefly by self-regarding motives. Neither does it look as if anything would happen in the near future to terminate their franchise. Of course in so combustible a society an explosion is always possible. France may precipitate a crisis at any time and so may other uneasy nations or groups. But assuming the avoidance of revolutionary explosions, successfully initiated either by militarists or communists, it will take many years for any social democratic party in any industrial country to create a body of public opinion sufficiently alert, well-educated and disinterested to provide the indispensable impulse and support for the conscious realization of a radical social policy.

Yet, I repeat, the grim necessity for radical social reformation will prevail even during a period of conservative government. Such governments were forced to abandon the old system during the war and substitute for it state capitalism supplemented by international economic cooperation. They did not like the experiment. When the fighting ceased, they fell back in so far as they could on de-control and international competition. But as the behavior of the Harding administration and of the Lloyd George government indicates, de-

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control and competition developed manifest abuses and difficulties which shriek for re-control and the revival of international cooperation. The governments in all the democratic industrialized countries are and will continue to be occupied in resuming regulative functions with respect to their own social economy which they started to exercise during the war and in establishing mutually beneficial economic treaties with the governments of other continents.

Private capitalism does not work as well as it did in 1914 chiefly in two respects. As the result of de-control under existing conditions the standard of living of millions of wage-earners, small property owners and salaried workers, for which the several governments have made themselves responsible, is seriously compromised. The former volume of production is impaired. It is impaired partly because the new states, created out of the old empires by the Treaty of Peace, have raised customs barriers in the way of the exchange of commodities, but chiefly because of the deterioration of mechanical equipment, the dearth of capital, the failure of the former agencies of credit and the disorganization of exchange. For these reasons high prices did not in 1919 and 1920 stimulate production. They merely swelled profits, which were to a considerable extent taken away finally from the profiteers in taxation but which in the end discouraged consumption. More recently, while lower commodity prices have supervened they have not availed to reinvigorate consumption. The power of the vast majority of Europeans and Americans to consume is substantially smaller than it was. Possibly this impairment of the motives for production will cure itself in time, but while the cure is slowly coming millions of people will starve, other millions may have their vitality permanently impaired, and still others will be forced to seek subsistence in foreign lands. At best the cure of private capitalism, if it can cure itself, would mean suffering of huge populations, prolonged social unrest, industrial sabotage, political disintegration, and probably some measure of frank popular revolt.

Statesmen will shrink from permitting this lingering disease from developing its own slow and costly remedy. They will revive the state capitalism and the inter-state cooperation of 1918. They are already beginning this revival. Private capitalism is preoccupied primarily with production. It is helpless if, when commodities are produced, they do not find consumers at profitable prices. It allows consumption to take care of itself. But state capitalism is better able to subsidize consumption and so stimulate production indirectly. That is what the belligerent governments did during the war. It is what the British government did when it contributed £10,000,000 to the wages-fund of the coal industry in order to avoid the social consequences of an excessively disastrous fall in the standards of living of the miners. The American government wants to act as banker for the railroads and furnishing capital to them, on the theory that the use of an increased power of consumption on the part of the railroads will start the wheels of industry. For an analogous reason it is financing the consumption of American agricultural products in foreign countries.

These are only the preliminary symptoms of an increasing compulsion to invoke the credit of the state as a substitute for the deficiencies of private credit. The default will continue. For an indefinite period, prudent statesmanship will be obliged to extend state interference and state control until in the end the government will probably dominate large scale industry. The cure will be dangerous. It will involve a tendency towards the centralization of economic power and the confusion of economic with political purposes, which, if unchecked, might develop more disastrous abuses than those which it is now intended to remedy. Nevertheless its adoption will serve as an indication of an increasing sense of collective responsibility on the part of conservative rulers for the welfare of their fellow citizens. It will involve a campaign for the elimination of some of the wastes of capital and human life which private capitalism cannot avoid. It will seek the increased production which society must have, not by the extravagant method of encouraging private profiteering but by stimulating consumption and by improving economic organization. It will prevail in spite of the opposition of big business, of the banks and of many of the politicians, because it will be popular with the wage-earners, the salaried workers and the small property owners. The necessarily large volume of taxation is shifting the control of credit and the function of accumulating and allocating capital from private capitalists to the state. There it will remain until the state is prepared to surrender it to trustworthy non-political agencies of cooperative production and distribution.

That a ruling class which is theoretically opposed to it should carry out such a radical modification of the old national economy may seem incredible, but it is not unprecedented. Radical social political and economic changes which have had any endurance are usually brought about by people who did not believe in them. In 1793 and in 1848 convinced republicans in France sought and failed to found a republic. In 1872 and 1873

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a French National Assembly, composed chiefly of convinced monarchists, were reluctantly successful in setting up an enduring substitute for the monarchy. Throughout the 19th century the British ruling class was consistently opposed to democracy, but the net results of its political and economic legislation was to organize a commonwealth which is nearer to being a thoroughgoing political democracy than any other modern industrialized community. So it goes. Radicals are rarely competent and are still more rarely sufficiently trusted by public opinion to build institutions according to the promptings of their own plan. But they undermine the authority of the old institutions and they accustom their more slowly moving fellows to the need of providing new habitations for the human spirit. The day arrives when the need becomes obvious and irresistible. The radicals are rejected and their counsel prevails.

As in the 19th cenury it took monarchists to institute enduring republics and privileged classes to organize democracies, so in the 20th century we shall see the advocates and beneficiaries of capitalist nationalism move in the direction of industrial democracy and the cooperative commonwealth. Except in America, unreformed capitalism has lost most of the authority which it possessed a generation ago. It is no longer sustained by any large volume and intensity of conviction. It retains, indeed, nothing like the amount of authority in its favor which legitimism and monarchy had in 1816. The steady stream of criticism during the last fifty years has undermined its standing more thoroughly than has been suspected; and of late its actual operations have exposed to its candid friends the force of the criticism. If the large amount of good which it contains is to be perpetuated, its friends must protect it by an elaborate process of reconstruction, and they will be the readier to see the light because in the society of today with its crushing burden of taxation, its incessant strains and its exasperating defaults, the life of a captain of industry is becoming almost as much possessed by impossible responsibilities and overwhelming anxieties as the life of an absolute monarch formerly was. Industrial autocracy will disappear as much by abdication as by dismissal and its functions will be taken over in part by the state, in part by engineers and in part by the mass of the wage-earners.

## IV

If the foregoing interpretation proves to be correct, and if during the next ten years or more conservative governments will reluctantly impose social reconstruction on unconvinced and disunited democracies, what in the meantime should be the behavior of the liberals and the radicals? Should they resolutely refuse to connive at the necessarily timid attempts to restore some kind of functional prosperity to society? Should they stubbornly and irreconcilably fight their conservative rulers on the ground that the old guard, being wrong-headed and half-hearted, cannot give birth to any remedial policy which a radical can trust and accept? Or should they cooperate with any existing government which seems to be trying with intelligence and good faith to carry out a policy of minor amelioration?

I prefer the second of these courses to the first. In so far as liberals are pragmatists they are bound to attach importance to continuity of results. They cannot be indifferent to the benefits which will accrue from achieving the transition from unreformed capitalism to a more socialized organization without the shock of revolutionary dislocation. Neither can they afford as human beings to settle down permanently into an attitude of irreconcilable opposition. If they do they will never provide an available substitute for their existing rulers except by virtue of a tour de force, analogous to that of the Communists in Russia. And as the circumstances under which revolutions are successful rarely occur, radicalism in democratic countries would move in the direction of systematic, pig-headed, futile and usually peevish fault-finding.

On the other hand, if liberalism and radicalism are to survive as a formative element in the public opinion of modern industrialized nations, they cannot remain satisfied with the ignoble function of removing the obstacles to social improvements which they themselves are not trusted to carry out. Republics founded by monarchists and democracies which emerge from the piece-meal reforms of a well-intentioned privileged class may have a greater survival value than republics or democracies founded by convinced radicals, but they are not equipped to move steadily towards the unfolding of their own formative ideas. They either harden down and cease to grow, or they grow without effective self-criticism in dubious directions. So it is with the economic predicament of modern society. Conservative governments during the next ten years, may and probably will bring about those immediately necessary readjustments which will save modern society from the revolutionary convulsions in the near future, but in the long run people who are convinced of the fundamental justice and availability of modern society will not dare or care to carry out its sufficiently drastic reorganization. If social reconstruc-

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tion is to endure and if a repetition of the present calamitous breakdown is to be avoided, the making of a better society will have to be taken over by men and women who have seen a vision of the better society and know why and how it should come to pass. Radicals and liberals will not attain this knowledge either by enlisting as the accomplices of well-intentioned conservative governments or by flourishing the flag of non-cooperation. Thev will have to make of themselves what they are not now—available substitutes for the groups and classes which rule modern democracies. In order to do so they need to inquire why during a period of dislocation, which partly at least vindicated their criticisms of modern social organization, they are rejected and rejected with reason as the healers of their own suffering communities. If they inquire candidly they will, I think, discover that they have defaulted at a critical moment in the history of modern civilization, not because liberalism is an unworthy and untrue interpretation of human fulfillment, but because they themselves have been untrue to the hope and spirit of their own faith.

The obvious superficial cause of this default was, as I have pointed out, the lack of an enlightened public opinion, which was capable of understanding the causes of the breakdown and of providing the indispensable popular support for conscious political and social reconstruction. The early liberals had assumed that public opinion in a modern democracy is a stream which purifies itself in the running, that it operates automatically and irresistibly in favor of enlightened political and social readjustment. The experience of the last few years has demonstrated the falsity of this assumption. The stream of public opinion does show a tendency to purify itself in the running, but this tendency is not powerful enough to counteract the pollution which the indifferent or the selfish inhabitants on its banks feed into its waters. On the whole the river of modern industrialized democracy cannot be trusted to purify itself. Its aberrations and pollutions need to be corrected, not merely by dykes, by the regulation of the volume of its current and by social antiseptics but by the re-analysis and purification of its sources in conviction and impulse.

It is the inability of liberalism and radicalism to call to their aid sufficiently vigorous and lucid sources of public conviction which accounts chiefly for their default. They both depend for their vitality on their ability to reenforce public opinion at once with specific knowledge and with positive disinterested conviction, and this indispensable task they have neglected. Liberals and radicals have sought on the whole to capture and exercise political and economic power rather than to give vigor and suppleness to humane ideals. They were right always to keep in mind the necessity of capturing power, for their kingdom, if they are capable of entering into it, must be of this world. But they were mistaken in failing to see that their power depended upon a vitality of opinion, upon a translation of opinion into a nearer approximation to truth, which the competition for power undermines. They cannot repair this mistake without reviving the primitive association between liberalism or radicalism and a conscious and militant humanism.

Liberalism originated in the belief that there exists a truth about human nature and human life which the human mind can attain and which, if attained and vindicated in action, will make for individual and social fulfillment. It risked its career upon the existence of a constructive relationship between life and truth, upon the successful search for a kind of truth which if known and followed will set men and women free. But the flag-bearers of liberalism have not pursued with sufficient devotion and flexibility the search for such liberating truth. They began by conceiving it as a knowledge of natural processes to which the human will must conform. Because they conceived it as primarily a knowledge of natural processes, they tended to become fatalists who waited on the event, who conceived the life of man and society as the play of forces and whose attention was concentrated on the exercise of political and economic power. But although a knowledge of natural processes was an indispensable part of the truth which would help to liberate mankind, it was not the essential part. The essential part, a knowledge of human nature and the truth about human nature, was, so it happened, disastrously falsified by the fatalism of an exclusively natural science. If liberals and radicals are ever to infuse into public opinion the vitality and the specific knowledge which the carrying out of any thoroughgoing program of social reconstruction demands, they will have to abandon their preoccupations and their consequent concentration on problems of power. They will have to substitute for it a search for an increasing knowledge of human behavior and how it can be modified, economized and fertilized. And this substitution will be equivalent on their part to a future subordination of problems of power to the old problem of getting innocent and easily diverted human beings to believe in the reality and the necessity of human salvation.

HERBERT CROLY.

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# On the Advantages of Censorship and Espionage

SOME choice spirits, on examining the conduct of governments relative to freedom of the press and teaching, seem to be alarmed lest it should have a deadening effect upon literature and education. They imagine that the heavy hand of the state will come down upon the imaginative writer and teacher, that petty bureaucrats will poison and choke the fountain of criticism and creation, and that American intellectual life will take on the tone and enthusiasm of the almanac. On first thought there seems to be some justification for the pessimistic view. The type of person who elbows his way to the front for the purpose of stopping his neighbor's mouth is not often a lovely or lovable figure. As the New York Times, with characteristic motive and insight, remarks of the moving picture censorship law, men of honor, judgment, and discrimination will hesitate to undertake the somewhat contemptible business of censoring American morals. The Times, for reasons which lie on the surface of things, does not raise the same question with regard to the people ready to engage in espionage under the Lusk bills, but no doubt similar reflections are justified. So it happens that liberals tremble at the thought of the deadly mediocrity that is about to settle down upon us.

Happily they have not reckoned well with the lessons of history. As compared with similar French legislation in the eighteenth century, the Lusk bills are, as Mr. Dooley might well remark, "triumphal arches through which the clever will drive in full regalia." Consider. In 1754, a Bourbon decree forbade absolutely the publication of any work dealing with government. The purpose was to prevent changes in the form thereof. Three years later this amusing order was followed by one, still more amusing, making it a capital offense to write any book calculated to stir up public sentiment (tendant à émouvoir les esprits). About the same time the death penalty was laid upon anyone who attacked religion, that is, the official system of France, or dared to explore the mysteries of finance.

These severe measures and more like them were not the mere diversions of a transitory Lusk committee. They had real teeth in them. Was not Voltaire imprisoned for twelve months on the mere charge that he had written a libel on that noble and virtuous prince, Louis XIV, so regularly and finely celebrated by the court scribes and members of the Academy? Was not Helvétius, that "malicious fomenter of disorder," as Mr. Ralph Easley would characterize him, compelled to compose two letters retracting several opinions expressed in his book on the human mind? Was not Desforges buried alive in a dungeon eight feet square for writing about the Pretender who wanted to take the English throne from the heavy German then occupying it? Was not the genial Diderot railroaded to the tomb at Vincennes for expounding certain ingenious theories about the mentality of the blind? True, they were hardly appropriate for a doctor's thesis, but they were harmless enough. What brilliant man of letters in the eighteenth century in France escaped the talons of the law? Scarcely one. Even the good Abbé Morellet was clapped into the Bastille for indulging in a bit of satire at the expense of the Princesse de Robeck. Mr. A. Stevenson would hardly want to send Heywood Broun to Sing Sing for three years for making a jocose, but not irreverent, remark about the first lady of Albany.

Now what was the effect of all this oppression and suppression in France? It was fourfold. Not a single man of intellectual worth was silenced. On the contrary many a man who preferred to work at mathematics or Latin was driven into the field of criticism by sheer rage at injustice. That was the first great result of censorship and prosecution. Tyranny revealed the system from which it sprang and multiplied its enemies. In the second place, the old hands at the game of sapping and mining were compelled to forge new weapons. On observing the stupidity of the censor, the jailer, and the hangman, the Voltaires and Diderots changed their phraseology, sharpened their wits, and devised a thousand novel and diverting ways of saying the forbidden things. Outcome: an immense improvement in the versatility, allusiveness, satirical qualities, flexibility, and charm of French literature. That which was flat, dull, and assertive became sharp, pointed, and ruinously insinuating. The rapier took the place of the bludgeon and the deadly vital wound was substituted for the surface bruise. In the third place, oppression made the forerunners of the revolution so angry that they did far more writing than they would have done had they been left alone. See the enraged Diderot coming out of Vincennes with his flaming sword grasped firmly by the hilt! His zeal was redoubled. He made everyone of his terrible weapons more deadly for priestcraft and statecraft. Finally the mass of the people whom the philosophers could not reach were aroused to interest at least by the burnings, banishings, and imprisonings. "It is necessary now for a publisher to beg a magistrate to burn a book in order to make it sell," laughingly wrote a wit in 1767.

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Reasoning from history there is no ground for discouragement over Lusk bills. Quite the contrary. We may expect an improvement in the literary skill of our teachers, the elimination of the routine stuff of criticism now tabu, a more widespread interest in currents of fresh ideas, and finally the same kind of stoppage in the course of thinking that occurred in 1789. Let it rejoice therefore. Let a banquet be given at the Crown and Thistle, let the bowl be replenished, and let us make merry, hoping that the Albany legislature will redouble its efforts and enlarge the bureau of censorship. It will also be good for our health. Are we not told that Juvenal lived to be nigh unto eighty years of age? CHARLES A. BEARD.

# The End of the Struggle in the Coal Industry

THE end of the struggle in the coal industry, after a lockout of more than twelve weeks affecting directly almost one million and a quarter miners, has synchronized with a general disposition on the part of the British labor movement to reconsider its position and to take stock of its resources. That disposition, if one may judge by the press and the utterances of public men, is frequently misunderstood in this country and the same is probably true of America. I shall hope to discuss it in another article. But the protagonists of the industrial side of it since the armistice have been the miners. In the course of their struggle issues were raised of an interest extending far beyond the coal industry, namely, the effect of the economic international situation, the desirability of establishing a pool and wages equalization fund, the difficulty (emphasized by the dramatic collapse of the Triple Alliance,) of securing effective cooperation between different unions. It may therefore be of some interest to American readers to explain shortly the causes of settlement and possible consequences of the dispute which has just terminated.

When the historian of the future comes to write his account of British economic history in the years following the great war, he will probably emphasize a good many matters which were hardly mentioned in current discussions of the recent crisis in the coal industry. He will observe, in the first place, that the days of easy mining and of Britain's virtual coal monopoly were long since passed and that, while the aggregate output had increased, the output per head had been falling for nearly twenty years before 1914. He will naturally conclude that rigid economy in the production, distribution and consumption of coal were necessary to husband the mineral resources upon which the economic prosperity of posterity rested, and will realize with amazement that, so far from that point of view being accepted for the truism which it was, the mere attempt to suggest that the efficiency of the traditional system of ownership and working might be improved provoked a storm.

Turning to the organization of the industry, this historian of the future will see that in certain fundamental respects it had been profoundly altered since the days of the pioneer in the middle of the nineteenth century, that scientific knowledge had enormously advanced, that the actual work of management had very largely passed into the hands of salaried officials, and that the owner had become less and less an industrial administrator and more and more the representative of business interests. He will discover that during the same period the character and quality of the mining population had undergone more fundamental changes than that of almost any class of workers in the country, that many working miners were highly skilled professionals holding undermanager certificates, and that, both in education and organization, the miner, who in 1850 had been spoken of almost as a savage, had achieved as high a standard of civilization as any body of workers in the community. He will notice that in the space of two and a half years there were no less than four serious disputes in the industry, and he will relate the changes mentioned above to that constant unrest, in particular to the demand that the coal industry should be carried on as a public service. He will, therefore, be amused by the resolute refusal of the mine-owners to admit that anything had altered since they were boys, and by the disposition of the public to ignore all causes of agitation except those ephemeral matters which are taken up by the daily press. He will say of the government's policy—but, for all I know, D. O. R. A. will still be with us a century hence, and I must not involve him in a prenatal prosecution. So he must be left to select the appropriate epithets for himself.

Needless to say, no one in any official position, from the Prime Minister downwards, has been so unpractical. As long as British opinion continues to be divided as sharply as at present about the fundamentals of the industrial system, any far-sighted or consistent policy will be impracticable, and in the recent disputes the fundamental question of making the industry more efficient by cutting out waste in production and distribution, the vital necessity of which has been emphasized by every independent expert, was not even mentioned. The miners had pleaded for it two years ago and had

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been told to mind their own business. The owners always argued that no such question existed: their case throughout has been that they are Titans upholding the fabric of British prosperity out of mere public spirit, and that any one who looks a gift horse in the mouth is a vulgar fellow. The government was naturally not concerned with posterity, which will not vote at the next election. Hence the most vital issue of all—that of reorganizing the industry in such a way as to make the most economical use of our mineral resources—has not even been raised. Its inefficiency will continue to be a public nuisance, until it becomes—what it is not far from being now—a public danger.

What the dispute turned on was a wage question, but it was a wage question of rather an unusual kind. When the strike of last autumn ended on November 3rd, one of the terms of settlement was that the owners' and the miners' federation should negotiate for the establishment of a scheme for the permanent regulation of wages. The system of "control" (under which standard profits were guaranteed and the government took the surplus), set up during the war was still in operation, and the government had promised that it should continue until March 31st of this year. But soon after Christmas it was evident that the decline in the export trade was creating a new situation. In 1920 British coal exports were 24,921,853 tons, compared with 73,400,118 tons in 1918. This was bad enough, but worse was to come. Owing partly to the depression of trade, partly to the dispute of last October, partly to the policy of the government in selling coal abroad at famine prices, in the first three months of this year the continental market for coal collapsed altogether. British exports for January to March were 5,397,402 tons in 1921, as against 8,365,769 in 1920 and 17,239,000 in 1915. The result was to convert the profit received by the Exchequer from the coal industry into a loss. For the months ending February 28th there was an adverse balance of £4,536,396.

In these circumstances the government threw overboard its promise to continue control till August 31st, and abolished it on March 31st. It was natural that it should be eager to escape any further responsibility for the industry. But its action was disastrous, and ultimately cost the country a sum compared with which the continuance of control would have been a bagatelle. For the effect was to bring negotiations between owners and miners to an abrupt conclusion. The former, if —which is improbable—they would ever have agreed to the settlement of wage advances and reductions on a national, as distinct from a district, basis, peremptorily refused to do so when control was withdrawn, insisted that each of the coal fields should make its own arrangements as to wages, and announced new rates which (apart from slight advances to certain classes of workmen in South Yorkshire) involved reductions ranging from ten per cent in some fields to over forty per cent in others.

The miners, without insisting that the same rates should be paid in all districts, had throughout the negotiations demanded that future advances and reductions should be equalized throughout the industry, and that for this purpose the poorer districts and collieries (as long as it was thought worth while to continue working them) should be aided by the more prosperous. If they had any doubt as to the desirability of that policy before, the immense variations in the reductions announced by the owners would have convinced then. The South Yorkshire miners, who stood to gain slightly by the proposals, declined to accept advances for themselves if the wages of the miners in South Wales were to be almost halved, and in other districts very largely reduced. The result was that the miners' federation insisted on the "pool" and the owners locked the men out till they would agree to reductions taking place on a district basis.

The question of the "pool" assumed almost mystical significance during the three months for which the struggle lasted. In reality, the reason why the miners attached importance to it were very simple. Like other trade unionists they attach importance to equalizing wage movements throughout the whole country. But in the coal industry the cost per hour of getting coal varies enormously from pit to pit and district to district, owing to natural conditions which are largely beyond human control. And those natural variations have during 1921 been crossed by another factor, the collapse of the export trade. The result was that, for the months ending March 31st, while the average costs of production per ton for the whole industry were 38s, 11.6d, they varied from 33s, 4d in the Midlands to actually 60s, 9.5d in South Wales. If, therefore, the miner argued, wages were to be determined solely on a district or area basis, the reductions needed in order that coal might be produced at a profit would have to be enormously greater in some districts than in others. Their solution, which they preferred, was to raise a fund by a levy on each ton produced, which should be administered by a central wages board and which should be used to assist the payment of a standard wage on the part of those collieries which otherwise could not afford it, provided that the central board decided that they were worth maintaining in production.

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The difficulties raised by this proposal were obvious. What guarantee would there be of efficient management and why should coal be produced at all in collieries which, in order to pay reasonable wages, needed assistance from the rest of the industry? On the other hand, the problem to be met was a genuine one, and the miners' solution of it, the essence of which was the partial unification of the industry, had been suggested in the past, though in a more drastic form, by persons (including some mine owners) of unimpeachable respectability. The argument that it involved subsidizing collieries which might not be worth carrying on was equally valid against the varying district rates proposed by the owners, which clearly involved keeping in production pits which would go under if they were obliged to pay on the same scale as their more prosperous competitors. The national board, representing the industry as a whole, would have power, it was argued, to close collieries which were likely to be a permanent burden on the industry. If additional safeguards were needed, it would be possible to stipulate that no colliery should receive from the pool more than a certain proportion of its wage bill, and that no colliery should take out of it over a period—say—of five years more than it paid in.

The proposition of the "pool" is worth some consideration, because, in one form or another, it must arise whenever any attempt is made to unify an industry. It was characteristic of the degree to which practical industrial issues have come to be complicated by the sharply divergent philosophies of employer and trade unionists that it was impossible to discuss so simple a matter as the settlement of the wages without raising the whole question of the principles upon which the organization of the industry ought to be based. The government fought the miners' program on that ground—that it was "political"—and the government's point of view finally prevailed. For, though the miners have obtained much better terms than those originally offered—terms which, if put forward in March, would very probably have averted a dispute—they have been obliged to acquiesce in the settlement of wages on a district basis. Practical reasons, in particular the fact that trade union funds are exhausted, are likely to prevent any sensational struggle in the industry for the next two years.

But only a very short-sighted observer would foretell a period of prolonged peace. The truth is that the recent settlement has settled nothing. From the point of view of the public it has almost every defect. On the one hand, it does nothing to remedy the proved deficiencies in the organization of the industry; on the other hand, since it relates wage movements to the aggregate profits in each coal field, it gives the miners an incentive to join hands with the owners over the body of the consumer and to make profits as large as possible. Nor will the miners accept it in liquidation of their larger claims. Believing, as many of them do, the present order in the coal industry to be economically discredited and morally bankrupt, they have accepted under economic force majeure an arrangement in the merits of which they have no confidence. Their opinion about the possibilities of industrial action has probably been altered. Their opinion about the desirability of getting rid as soon as practicable of private ownership has been strengthened. What is to be expected, therefore, is a period of industrial quiescence, accompanied by a renewed interest in political action.

R. H. Tawney.

# How It Works

SCENE: A hot New York Sunday. Mr. Bricker, the iceman, is arguing in his four room flat. Mrs. Bricker wishes to stay indoors and sit around in her underclothes, it's so hot. Mr. Bricker and the two boys wish to go to the beach.

Mrs. Bricker predicts the beach will be crowded and the cars will be jammed. She would like to go, yes, but too many others will be there. The whole city can't go to the beaches. Somebody has to stay home.

She is over-ruled, and two hours later the Bricker family is at City Island. They stand in line to hire a bath-house, except the boys, who undress in the bushes. After standing in line until after two o'clock, they give up. They find a place to sit on the grass and they get out their sandwiches. Policemen come and order everybody off. The crowd gets up and moves. They settle down again, further over. The policemen again move them on. This goes on for an hour; and then, thank God, the policemen get tired. There aren't enough of them to keep this crowd from sitting down somewhere.

There is an enormous demand for soft drinks. The price goes up to twenty-five cents a bottle. Mr. Bricker buys four bottles for his family and himself, and feels cheated.

It is now nearly six. There is still a line waiting to hire bath-houses. But after six o'clock none will be rented. The Brickers decide to go home. But City Island is a long way from the subway, and the busses that connect with it have raised their

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fare—they want twenty cents. The jitneys are charging fifty cents instead of a quarter. The Brickers are furious. Everywhere the crowd is at the mercy of small profiteers who charge extra for everything, just because there *is* such a crowd.

Mr. Bricker and I talk about this, the following day. I deny that he has any just grounds for complaint.

If new companies built enough bath-houses to supply the demand on hot days, they would have too many for the ordinary Sunday, and they would lose money. Will Mr. Bricker agree to go to City Island every week and hire a bath-house? No, he wants to be free to go elsewhere when he likes, or stay home. In other words, he will not pay anyone to have more bath-houses ready.

But how about the soft-drink men and the busses, he says.

Well, Mr. Bricker, their function is to regulate the size of the crowd. If not enough people come, they lower their rates, and that draws them. If too many come, they put up their rates and that keeps some away. They don't do this consciously, maybe, but that is the effect. When they make a big profit, it is just as though that were a fee, which we, the community, were paying them, for exercising this function.

Mr. Bricker says it is enough to make a party a socialist.

Yes? But under socialism you would be complaining just the same, Mr. Bricker. Either there wouldn't be enough bathhouses for the demand at its peak, or if there were you would have to pay to have them built, which you refuse now to do.

Mr. Bricker suddenly changes around and says he's not for socialism. He doesn't want to have his life regulated, he wants to be free.

What do you call free, I ask him, suddenly changing myself. If too many people go to the beach somebody's bound to forbid it. Under socialism, small bureaucrats and their agents would work the thing out, and only let you go every third Sunday, say, and you wouldn't like that. But under capitalism, though you seem to be free to go and come as you please, if too many of you go to one place you are fined, as it were, by small profiteers. Under socialism you would pay the bureaucrats salaries. You pay the profiteers extra profits. Which would give you better service? It's a toss-up. They would be much the same men.

Somebody ought to write a book about political systems, that would explain some of these little necessary workings of each.

CLARENCE DAY, JR.

# CORRESPONDENCE

[The New Republic welcomes communications from its readers in regard to subjects of current interest, and especially concerning articles which have appeared in its columns. Those of 300 words or less are necessarily more available for publication than longer letters.]

## A Question for Mr. Furuseth

SIR: In your issue of July 20th there is an article by Andrew Furuseth entitled Mastery of the Sea. After presenting a convincing argument tending to establish the thesis that a nation's power is dependent on its native seaman-power, Mr. Furuseth ends in a fulmination against "union-busting" shipowners. One gets the impression that American sea power is doomed because at a certain specific time when ships are rotting for want of cargo certain specific reactionary shipowners refused certain specific "demands" of the Seamen's Union. There is no attempt in the article to deal with the difficult underlying problem presented by the continuous conflict of interest between the union and the shipowners.

The article contains a reference to the National Maritime Board of Great Britain and the reader may conclude that Mr. Furuseth favors such a Board for this country. He does not. In 1919 those responsible for advising the United States Shipping Board as to its policy in industrial relations foresaw the continuous strife which would inevitably follow a return to the old status, and proposed the formation of a National Marine Council, modeled on the British plan but adapted to the conditions of our own merchant marine. The Shipping Board gave its official approval of the idea, and a conference of all marine interests was called in Washington to agree upon a definite plan. Industrial conditions were reversed at that time, Europe was consuming cargoes with an apparently insatiable appetite, marine stocks were making "new highs" on the stock exchange and delightful melons were being sliced for the stockholders. The shipping men were in a favorable mood, and sent to the conference representatives authorized to cooperate in establishing a permanent Marine Council. The Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association had informally approved of the idea and the associations of deck officers seemed favorable. The Seamen's Union alone was hostile, and their hostility to the idea drew all its strength from the dominating figure of Mr. Furuseth.

Ex-Governor Robert P. Bass, who had been called from his home in New Hampshire to assist at the conference, pleaded with the delegates for hours during a hot summer session. Mr. Furuseth picked flaws in the draft constitution of a Marine Council submitted by the Shipping Board. "Change it then," said Mr. Bass. "We want none of it," said Mr. Furuseth. Pressed for his reasons, Mr. Furuseth stated that whereas the union was strong in the "economic" field, it would be weak in the "diplomatic" field. Moreover, the Council would destroy the union, apparently because it might change the nature of the jobs held by some local officers. Those who knew the splendid type of leaders developed by Mr. Furuseth had little respect for these reasons. Nevertheless he was obdurate. "What is it you want?" asked Mr. Bass. "Preferential employment," reiterated Mr. Furuseth. "We won't give it," said the shipowners. The conference ended getting nowhere and the situation gradually drifted into a disastrous strike.

What does Mr. Furuseth now propose? He knows that liberal voices will prevail in the shipowners' ranks when business becomes brisk and seamen scarce. No company can afford idle ships when cargoes wait. When that time comes will he again squeeze for compliance with a few specific "demands" only to lose what he gains at the next turn of the wheel? Or will he be a statesman laboring to establish a process and a tradition

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for cooperation? Now is the time for him to prepare. "Tomorrow is another day,"—he himself has said it.

HERBERT B. EHRMANN.

Boston.

## Mr. Furuseth Replies

SIR: Your correspondent, Mr. Ehrmann, takes me to task because in my article under the caption Mastery of the Sea I have not dealt with the "difficult underlying problem presented by the continuous conflict of interest between the Union and the shipowners."

Mr. Ehrmann, who was for a time employed in the Industrial Relations Division of the Shipping Board, refers to the efforts made in 1919 to form a National Marine Council "modeled on the British plan," etc. The American Seamen's Union would have been delighted to function under a Marine Council modeled on the British plan. But the spokesmen for the American Shipowners strenuously objected to the most vital feature of the British plan, i. e., "preferential employment to unionists."

Then and now the organized British shipowners frankly recognized the organized seamen as essential factors and responsible partners in the struggle for mastery of the sea. Then and now the organized shipowners of America refused to give like recognition to the organized seamen of America.

Mr. Ehrmann is grievously mistaken in his assertion that the American Seamen's Union was hostile to the formation of a National Marine Council. A month before the conference to which reference is made, our official publication urged "the creation of a body, or council, composed of shipowners and seamen, whose function it shall be to supervise the operation of the ships and to exercise at least advisory authority in all matters relating to the conditions of the seamen employed on ships." In elaborating upon this idea the Seamen's Journal, under date of May 14, 1919, said:

> "By the very fact of its existence a council of this character would tend to create confidence between shipowners and seamen, and thus make possible the establishment of relations of the most intimate kind, ultimately extending as far in the direction of practical control as the parties to them may deem advisable. . . .
>
> "In the final analysis, the future of the American Merchant Marine will depend largely upon the character and dependability of the human element involved. A national maritime spirit is most essential to the successful operation of our country's new mercantile fleet. And the basis of such a spirit is cooperation, confidence and joint responsibility by and between the small group who direct the operation of ships and the larger body of men who are engaged in the manifold duties of sailing the ships from port to port."

Mr. Ehrmann is also in error in his statement that the Washington conference of June 4 and 5, 1919, "ended getting nowhere." This conference arranged for future joint committee meetings to be held at New York and unanimously "resolved" that the said committee should also consider and "make recommendations as to the establishment of local grievance committees . . . and also the establishment of a Central Appeal Board."

This was only a step from a National Marine Council. But the private shipping interests wanted neither a Board nor a Council if this meant official recognition of the Seamen's Union. During the war their hands were forced to some extent, but as time rolled by their power and influence with the Shipping Board increased until, under the regime of Admiral Benson, the shipowners virtually dictated the labor policy.

ANDREW FURUSETH.

Washington.

## An Appeal for Two Prisoners

SIR: In the April 19, 1919, issue of the New Republic, there appeared an Open Letter to the President from Alexander Sydney Lanier, late Captain of the Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, U. S. A. It was a searching analysis of the validity of the prosecution and verdict in the trial known as the Chicago I. W. W. case, illustrated specifically by the cases of Charles Ashleigh and Vincent St. John. Of the mass conviction he says:—

> "I am of the opinion that these men were convicted contrary to the law and the evidence, solely because they were leaders of a revolutionary organization against which public sentiment was justly incensed; and that the verdict rendered was a foregone conclusion from the beginning in obedience to a public hysteria and popular demand, due to the psychology of the times."

Of the two defendants mentioned he has this to say:

> There can be no question, in my opinion, of the absolute innocence and wrongful conviction of Charles Ashleigh and Vincent St. John in particular. I defy anyone to show me one scintilla of evidence in the record of this trial that proves that either of the above defendants conspired with anyone to violate any law, or that they did, in fact, violate any law, as charged and set forth in the indictment, or otherwise.

These two men and several others have now made application for pardon and the matter is now in the hands of Pardons Attorney James A. Finch, whose recommendations will shortly be presented to Attorney General Daugherty. The success of their applications will be materially helpful to the cause of others now in prison on similar charges and we earnestly urge the readers of the New Republic to write at once to Mr. Daugherty expressing their interest and opinions on these cases. Mr. Daugherty has said publicly that each case will be decided on its individual merits. It is in this hope that these cases are being pressed at this time. Please write at once.

New York City. ELIZABETH GURLEY FLYNN.

## There is no Dye Monopoly

SIR: The general tone of your editorials and articles since the establishment of your periodical has been one which tended to impress reasonable people, however much they may have disagreed with the substance of your statements, with evident fairness of intention, and a desire to ascertain the facts.

This attitude of the New Republic makes all the more astounding an editorial in its issue of July 20, 1921, upon the dye industry. It is quite true that this article is an editorial and may therefore be considered a personal opinion, yet its wording is not such as would lead its readers to believe that an opinion only is being presented, but rather a statement of positive and uncontrovertible facts. The incident is discouraging to one who has looked to the New Republic for a clear-sighted and fearless statem nt of abuses and wrongs wherever discovered. Upon the first subject with which the writer is thoroughly familiar, the facts upon which the New Republic has based its erroneous opinion are so wide of the truth that it throws doubt upon the value of any other statements the paper may make on subjects with which the writer is wholly unfamiliar. Your erroneous statements are these: You attribute the existence of our dye industry solely to the confiscation of German property and patents. The dye industry is in existence today because of the impossibility of obtaining dyes from any other source than this country immediately after August 1st, 1914. The outbreak of the war coincided with the beginning of a shortage of dye-stuffs which became acute and on the other hand with the establishment of a chemical industry, due to the manufacture of explosives, on a larger scale in this country than ever before. It was not only inevitable that the demand for dyes should have been supplied, but that those companies already manufacturing chemicals should have been the first to attempt to fill the want. You state that in 1920 88,000,000 pounds of dye-stuffs were produced in this country with an average value of $1.08 per pound and that German dye imports for the year amounted to only two per cent of this total and you therefore conclude that not only is the American industry very healthy for an infa t, but you imply that the proposed embargo for three years would exclude this very slight German competition. The true situation is that had not the War Trade Board's activity been in force during 1920 this situation would almost certainly have been reversed and that the United States would have been forced to import 98 per cent of its dyes instead of 2 per cent. We must not overlook the fact that the imposition of an embargo is not something new or intended to give added protection to an industry which can easily stand alone and without such protection. It is merely a continuation of an arrangement which has been in existence since the war and which made the use of dyes in this country possible between 1914 and 1918; and which would have been immediately wiped out of existence if German dyes could have been imported subsequent to the armistice.

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You give one or two instances of dyes which have increased in price to a multiple of the pre-war figure, implying that this is due to the greed of American manufacturers and to the proposed licensing system, but you do not take the trouble to ascertain that there are certain dyes that are selling at practically the pre-war price! Of which sulphur black (consumed to a larger extent than any other dye-stuff) is a notable example.

"Who is going to be protected? Last of all at this rate, those who buy the clothes," you remark. Let us assume that the average weight of a suit of clothes is five pounds—which is, of course, in excess of the weight of a dress. Let us further assume that a dark shade is desired and that it will require 2 per cent of its weight of dye-stuff to obtain this shade. This will mean something less than two ounces of dye, which at your average valuation of $1.08 per pound would amount to $.14 as the cost of the dye-stuff in a suit of clothes. It may be that a gullible public can be persuaded to pay higher prices for clothing due to the statement of an unscrupulous salesman that the increased price is due to the cost of the dye-stuff, but can you reasonably maintain that the cost of $.14 for the dye involved would or should increase the cost of the suit or dress to the ultimate consumer?

You mention Mr. Frear's passionate discussion of the "giant dye monopoly" and quite deliberately imply, although you do not so state, that Mr. Garvan's equally passionate reply is of such nature as to lend weight to Mr. Frear's statement. There may be a dye monopoly in the United States but if so, the multitude of small manufacturers of dye-stuffs, with one of which the writer is connected, is not yet aware of its existence.

When an industry seriously claims that its very existence is dependent upon sufficient protection, is not that statement worth enough respect and consideration to warrant your writer of editorial notes digging into the facts instead of merely scratching the surface.

Newark, New Jersey. C. P. Harris.

## Mr. Einstein: A Correction

SIR: In an editorial on Carpentier (July 20th) you attribute to Einstein the assertion that he "met one, or possibly two, persons in the United States who seemed to him to have understood his theory." Permit me to point out that Professor Einstein never said anything of the kind. On the contrary, before leaving this country he publicly expressed his keen appreciation of the intelligent and sympathetic interest that American men of science have shown in the theory of relativity. Considering the fact that for twelve years American mathematicians and physicists in our leading universities have been writing books and scientific articles and giving regular courses on the theory of relativity, the notion that this theory is the esoteric possession of one or two men is too silly to be repeated in a serious journal like the New Republic.

Let me also take this occasion to call attention to the fact that there is nothing ungenerous in Einstein's references to American science in the Dutch interview which our newspapers have made a cause celèbre. If Einstein is correctly quoted there, he only said what leaders of the American Association for the Endowment of Science have repeatedly called attention to, viz. that America cannot compare with the leading European nations in the number of scientific men of really first-rate importance. A confirmation of this is to be found in the fact that only two Americans have won the Nobel prize in science. I am glad, however, to testify from personal knowledge that Professor Einstein has a most generous admiration for these American men of science who, like Michelson, Millikan or Jacques Loeb, are making important contributions to the advancement of human knowledge.

New York City. Morris R. Cohen.

## What Interest on Postal Savings?

SIR: What rate of interest ought the Post Office to pay on savings deposits? That rate is now two per cent. It is proposed to raise it to three. Well and good. But the New Republic says why not make it four? Why not pay as much to depositors as the average savings-bank?

One answer is that the Post Office system gives more safety. Not much more, hardly any more possibly, than a well-managed savings-bank, but it isn't always possible for a depositor to pick out that kind of bank, or to assure himself annually that it is keeping up to its old reputation. The Post Office saves him this much trouble at least, in all cases; and in many cases, it gives him more safety besides. In other words, it gives him more value. Why shouldn't he pay for it?

Another point: the task of collecting hidden savings and putting them to work is already being handled by our widespread system of savings-banks. The only savings they cannot attract are those of the suspicious or ignorant. The Post Office is a desirable instrument for attracting this group. But from a community standpoint it is not desirable that ignorance and suspicion should be paid quite as much as intelligence. It takes away an incentive from Caliban to learn how to be Prospero.

If the Post Office pays as much as the banks do, it may hurt the banks' business. It may at least hamper their expansion. You say that is no matter. These banks are benevolent institutions whose one excuse for existence is service, and if some other system serves the purpose as well, why not let the banks die? The answer is that this situation is not quite so simple. So long as these banks keep their place in our general machinery, they will serve to direct a flow of capital toward our railroads and industries, by investing in the best bonds of the best and most stable concerns. If the Post Office system goes so far as to interfere with this flow, it will deflect some or all of this capital to government uses. Would not this be unfortunate? The government can readily borrow any funds it may need. Our industries and railroads find it harder. They need the banks' help.

New York City. Clarence Day, Jr.

[Grant that the postal savings bank offers greater safety. That may be a reason why the depositors should be willing to take lower interest; is it any reason why an enlightened government should pay less, when the benefit of security costs the government nothing? Grant that the appeal of the postal savings banks is to the suspicious or ignorant. Since time immemorial there have been private interests sweating profits out of suspicion and ignorance, more accurately, out of helplessness and poverty. Do we wish our government to emulate such businesses? It is besides not true at all that soundly managed private savings banks are accessible to the whole population. In this respect sectional differences are marked. There is no great danger that the postal savings banks would deflect funds from private to government uses. If the postal savings banks invest exclusively in government bonds, the price of the bonds passes into the hands of sellers, to be used in private industry. There is no reason, however, why postal savings banks should not be permitted, or even required, to invest in mortgages, etc., if that were regarded as desirable.—The Editors.]

## The West has not Passed

SIR: In a recent issue of your paper was printed an article on The Passing of the West. As a resident of the great and almost unknown (to eastern writers) Southwest, I was rather astounded at the ignorance of the subject therein displayed. In this day and age of turmoil, unrest, Reds and slaughter of ideals, political back-biting and universal lying, one can at least expect the truth about the country one lives in, so at least I thought until I read the above mentioned article.

If the writer will venture over into New Mexico I can personally show him any amount of scenery, untrammeled by the shining "bands of steel" he mentions. Show him great, vast open spaces, unfenced; miles of broad, flat fertile mesas upon which bald-faced cattle still graze. Lofty mountains, their rich storehouses untouched; streams unchained to the wheels of commerce and over all old Sol still pours out his golden, life-giving, healing light and the skies are bluer than turquoise.

A good many things of the old days have gone—chiefly the two-gun man—but the cowpuncher is still in our midst with the same ability to straddle anything on four legs be it horse or steer. He talks with the same old lingo and wears the same old wide-brimmed hat and goat-fur pants, not mentioning the wicked forty-five hung with careless grace upon his hip, and he can rope a steer just about as efficiently as the boys of forty years ago.

To say that the "West is passing" is just about as near the truth as it would be to say that the United States of America is governed by the people or that the late war made the world safer for the Democrats. The West is passing—not into oblivion as some would have us think but passing ahead of the dollar-chasing East. It still is the land of opportunity. Here in its boundless bigness, we the freemen live, taking life as it comes, enjoying to the nth degree the marvellous works of nature untrodden by the feet of commerce, unsmirched by the clutching hand of greed, unbranded by the dollar sign. J. M. R.

Taos, New Mexico.

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# VERSE

## Nonchalance

This cool and laughing mind, renewed
From covert sources like a spring's,
Is potent to translate the mood
Of all distraught and twisted things.

In this clear water shall be cast
Outrageous shapes of steel and gold,
And all their hot and clotted past
Beaded with bubbles silver-cold.

The moving power takes their heat
Into itself, forgetting them;
And warmth in trickles, slow and sweet
Comforts a fainting lily-stem.

ELINOR WYLIE.

## Sonnet

What's this of death, from you who never will die?
Think you the wrist that fashioned you in clay,
The thumb that set the hollow just that way
In your full throat and lidded the long eye
So roundly from the forehead, will let lie
Broken, forgotten, under foot, some day
Your unimpeachable body, and so slay
The work he most had been remembered by?

I tell you this: whatever of dust to dust—
Goes down, whatever of ashes may return
To its essential self in its own season,
Loveliness such as you will not be lost,—
But, cast in bronze, upon his very urn
Make known him master, and for what good reason.

EDNA ST. VINCENT MILLAY.

## Susanna

Under a birch-tree in the park
She sits and sews till nearly dark.
Her knees are crossed. On either hand
Old men like watchful angels stand.

A brass band squeals. The vibrant brass
Stirs the dust on the tarnished grass.
The old men preen their lean moustaches,
Hearing, through her, the music's crashes.

Lovers around her, far and near,
Trill in the dust and say "My dear":
The music thrills to a slow emotion
Of hands that torpid human ocean.

The old men weary. But others come,
Lured by the fleshly horn and drum.
The sultry ragtime from Havana
Moves them, but does not move Susanna.

The lamplight shows her sitting, still,
With meek hands folded. It is chill.
Faint dew maculates the bushes,
In all Hyde Park there are seven thrushes.

CONRAD AIKEN.

## Decoration

*For W.*

A macaw preens upon a branch outspread
With jewelry of seed. He's deaf and mute.
The sky behind him splits like gorgeous fruit
And claw-like leaves clutch light till it has bled.
The raw diagonal bounty of his wings
Scrapes on the eye color too chafed. He beats
A flattered tail out against gauzy heats,
He has the frustrate look of cheated kings.
And all the simple evening passes by:
A gillyflower spans its little height,
And lovers with their mouths press out their grief.
The bird fans wide his stripes' regality
Prismatic, while against a breath-white sky
A crystal tree lets fall a crystal leaf.

LOUISE BOGAN.

## A Girl Adoring

His kisses touch her marvelling eyes
And wander searching through her thinking face;
And though so loved and near she lies
He knows he travels in a distant place.

And as he clasps her close close form
He does not know the far goal of his kiss,
What clouds and isles and ships and storm
That haunted stillness of her body is.

Her eyes are dry, he does not know
He sails with Noah on the endless flood;
Her breast is pale, he sees not how
Behind leaps the Niagara of her blood.

Upon her brow his hand is light
Above her mind's deep-sunken cities there.
He knows not in her breath's sharp flight
What splintered Indian mountains break the air.

He does not know, how far, how far;
Only she makes him think of some strange land.
Beyond the earth his journeys are,
Touching that wild, wild heart and thinking hand.

VIOLA MEYNELL.

## Evening

There was an evening when the sky was clear,
Ineffably translucent in its blue;
The tide was falling, and the sea withdrew
In hushed and happy music from the sheer
Shadowy granite of the cliffs; and fear
Of what life may be, and what death can do,
Fell from us like steel armor, and we knew
The beauty of the Law that holds us here.
It was as though we saw the Secret Will,
It was as though we floated and were free;
In the south-west a planet shone serenely,
And the high moon, most reticent and queenly,
Seeing the earth had darkened and grown still,
Misted with light the meadows of the sea.

SARA TEASDALE.

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# The Fruits of Victory

*The Fruits of Victory, a sequel to The Great Illusion, by Norman Angell. New York: The Century Co.*

FEW men have ever lived to see themselves so borne out by facts as Norman Angell. When he published The Great Illusion he had nothing to offer but a hypothesis, the hypothesis that modern war is futile. That hypothesis did certainly reach headquarters and stir up excitement. We know that prime ministers raced for the book, that King Edward recommended it and the Kaiser as well. We know that The Great Illusion went bombinading around the world and circulated well over a million copies. But we know also, ironically too, that the very men who read it most closely, defied it most heartily. Not only the militarists sneered at Mr. Angell and called him a Jew and yowled at him as a pacifist-internationalist, but the people who thought there was a great deal in it threw it to the winds in the heat of rivalry and armament. And yet, in the outcome, Norman Angell was dead right. He was not unpractical. He was not pacifist-internationalist. He was not propagandizing for an emasculated world. He simply had a tight hold on the economic realities of inter-dependent modern states and he knew that large-scale war must become civil war, and civil war must become suicide. That is what he said in The Great Illusion. But pugnacity, which obeys laws of its own, got the better of his million circulation. Ten million men died for the great illusion.

Norman Angell didn't, as some people assert, say that war was impossible. He never said it was *impossible*. He said it was futile. "Useless—even when victorious, as a means of securing those moral and material ends which represent the needs of modern European peoples." This futility was his thesis—the futility of modern war, war between modern states, to secure economic advantage, to enforce moral ideals, to impose social institutions. No thesis could have been more straightforwardly, more bluntly and unhesitatingly, advanced. No thesis could have been put to proof more completely. The victory of the Allies has been sweeping enough to allow them to basket the fruit. What has the fruit been? The Allies no less than the Central Powers are forced to testify, in the face of their own shameless propaganda, that military power has secured neither economic advantage nor moral ideals.

Now Norman Angell writes the sequel to The Great Illusion. We have had our war, with one big heap of noble causes thrown in. On the theory that the Hun was wicked, (it might just as well have been the Russians or the Japanese or the British), we assumed that the wicked one was in direct conflict with us on matters of vital interest; we employed force to the limit ("a vast orgy of physical self-destruction") and we have reaped "moral violence and chaos." What that moral violence and chaos has resulted in, Mr. Angell summarizes in detail. By the very fact that we had to get and keep a preponderance of power we were compelled "to change or modify or betray the cause for which we entered the war." And having started on that betrayal by secret treaties, (which honest Woodrow never even suspected), and having dosed ourselves with propaganda, (shot through with lies), we now find ourselves flung back on a nationalism which is intense, irresponsible and immoral. Such irresponsibility and immorality, Mr. Angell insists, are just as unavoidable in the functioning of pugnacious nationalism as economic futility is inevitable in modern war. And thus he winds up, as Bertrand Russell and Max Eastman and Thorstein Veblen have wound up before him, with a call for the revision of "sovereign" popular national ideas.

Owing to the way Mr. Angell writes his books—by accretion and agglomeration rather than by orderly evolution—it is not easy to pick out his main line of thinking or to decide on the relative importance of the striking arguments which force themselves into the text at all points and from all points. But in this Gothic structure it is made clear from many angles that "the ideas which produce war—the fears out of which it grows and the passions which it feeds—produce a state of mind that ultimately renders impossible the cooperation by which alone wealth can be produced and life maintained." This contradiction between war and interdependence underlies his philosophy. All sorts of subsidiary ideas come in. "If to Nationalist hostilities as we have known them in the past, is to be added the commercial rivalry of nations now converted into traders and capitalists, we are likely to have not a less but more quarrelsome world, unless the fact of interdependence is much more vividly realized than in the past. This is an important secondary point, but the main poin is "the just anger that makes men unjust," the lust for coercion that lurks in nationalism, the political poison that war generates. If one seizes this idea, the idea that pugnacity breaks down interdependence and that the breakdown means an unworkable society, one has the clue to The Fruits of Victory.

The facts of this breakdown are not sufficiently realized. Mr. Angell helps us to realize them and helps us to understand how the process is being accelerated by those very ideas that he proved futile in The Great Illusion. He believes that we have practically no statesmanship anywhere, no social discipline. "To restrain the combative instinct sufficiently to realize the need of cooperation, demands a social discipline which the prevailing political traditions and moralities of Nationalism and Patriotism not only do not furnish, but directly discourage." This is nothing new, but it should lead conscientious people to the real moral crux of pacifism—"what price, in terms of national independence, are we prepared to pay for a world law?" "European society is today threatened with disintegration as the result of ideas and motions that have collected round Patriotism." A political Reformation is needed, to change this whole philosophy of patriotism, to deprive nationalism of its passionate misconceptions.

Because he is essentially a realist, Norman Angell has thus naturally turned from his demonstration of the futility of war to an analysis of the reasons why men forewarned should have plunged themselves into such hellish futility. On the whole, and remembering the ampleness of his case against nationalist politics as they exist, one must admit that his account of pugnacity is astonishingly close to the facts. What, then, is to be done with us? How are we to get a "better social tradition"? How can we get rid of the feeling that the "enemy" is wicked, etc.? How can we socialize nationalism?

(Don't let us ask such questions, by the way, as top-dogs. Let us suppose we are Haitians, or Bulgarians of the Dobrudja, or Germans of the Southern Tyrol who've actually got a raw deal, or some other acknowledged victims of the war).

Norman Angell, it seems to me, is wise to say: "However mischievous some of the manifestations of Nationalism may prove, the worst possible method of dealing with it is by the forcible repression of any of its claims which can be granted with due regard to the general interest. To give Nationalism full play, as far as possible, is the best means of attenuating its worst features and preventing its worst

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developments. This, after all, is the line of conduct which we adopt to certain religious beliefs which we may regard as dangerous superstitions. Although the belief may have dangers, the social dangers involved in forcible repression would be greater still." Exactly. Mr. Angell, unlike Mr. H. G. Wells, knows that nationalism thrives on repression; and Mr. Angell, unlike Mr. Wells, dreads the idea of bullying. But granted that he is right in these tactics, by what means does he propose to wean "public opinion" (i. e., "the sum of the forces which become articulate in a country") from "competing national military power"?

His only weapon, so far, is critical intelligence. He says the church, the school, the press, the state, are all mobilized by nationalism; and yet against "false pretences, sham heroics, immeasurable hypocrisy," he thinks the truth can win. "We don't believe that we need the cooperation of the foreigner, or we believe that we can coerce him." This is fundamental animal blindness to be remedied by "the obligation to be intelligent; the responsibility of will; the burden of thought." "There is no refuge but in truth." And there he stops.

It is noble, but we need something else. Men need to feel, to believe, that the whole game of competitive life—of which war is simply a projection—is not worth living. The mechanism by which we go ahead in our attempt to secure domination—that mechanism must be broken. But it cannot be broken so long as men in thousands and hundreds of thousands are victimized by state, church, school, press. Thus, following up the steps which Norman Angell has hewn with such courage, such devotion, such large purpose, you come once more to the revolution of which Ibsen spoke so many years ago: the revolution in the soul of man.

FRANCIS HACKETT.

# The Age of the Reformation

*The Age of the Reformation, by Preserved Smith. (American Historical Series, edited by C. H. Haskins.) New York: Henry Holt and Co.*

BY his admirable work on Luther Mr. Smith has so proved his competence that no one would ask him to furnish an excuse for writing an extended book on the Reformation. Nevertheless, he gives us this one: "The excuse for writing another history of the Reformation is the need of putting that movement in its proper relations to the economic and intellectual revolutions of the sixteenth century." This being the object, political events, though by no means ignored, are treated as incidental and illustrative of the main theme. The work opens with a chapter on The Old and the New—an admirable orientation of the reader in respect to the three "revolutions" which it is the purpose of the book to describe. Then follow six chapters which deal with the Reformation in Germany, Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, England, and Scotland; one which deals with the Counter Reformation; one which deals with the Spanish and Portuguese explorations; and four which deal with the subjects Social Conditions, The Capitalistic Revolution, The Main Currents of Thought, and The Temper of the Times. The work closes with an extremely well informed chapter on The Reformation Interpreted, which traces the history of the various interpretations of the Reformation from the sixteenth century down to, and including, that of Mr. Smith himself.

The work is eminently scholarly, informing and readable. Packed with concrete facts drawn from a great variety of sources, well arranged, presented in a style that is always clear, that never lags, that is often brilliant, the work should be as popular as a thoroughly scholarly and judicious book on the Reformation could be. A brilliant book, devoted to the exposition of a novel interpretation of the Reformation, might indeed attract a wider interest. Mr. Smith's interpretation is an independent one, but not a novel or a profoundly original one. His role is to know thoroughly the best, and the worst, that has been thought and said on the subject, to give due consideration to every point of view, and then in the light of this information, supplemented by his own careful study of the subject, much of it at first hand, to reach conclusions that are, as far as may be, sane and unbiassed. Of course every one is biassed; and I do not mean that Mr. Smith adopts the inept method of finding truth by following a safe middle ground between opposite ideas. He has a mind which he employs fearlessly, and opinions of his own which he does not hesitate to express. His sanity is the result of thorough knowledge, and his objectivity is of that genuine sort which comes from having no cause to defend and no practical aims to further—except the most practical of all aims, the desire to know for the sake of knowing.

Not the least interesting and valuable chapters are those which describe the social, economic, and intellectual conditions of the time. The material for such description, as any one knows who has tried to get it, cannot be gathered from a few "standard authorities." Mr. Smith's discussion of such topics as population, wealth and prices, sumptuary laws, dress, food, sports, manners, the position of women, pauperism, and the regulation of labor, is based upon wide and careful research; and these chapters are not only extremely interesting, but extremely valuable precisely because there are almost no books in English where the general reader or the hard worked College student can find anything comprehensive and at the same time concrete on these subjects. No doubt exceptions might be taken here and there to the author's conclusions. One might question whether a man of to-day with $5,000 income is "better off than a man with . . . any income" was in the sixteenth century. Again, Mr. Smith is well aware of the low value of money in the sixteenth century as compared with the twentieth century—a difference which he estimates at 10 to 1; but it is not clear whether he takes account of this difference in comparing the fortune of Jacques Coeur, the richest man in France in his day, with that of very rich men of our time. In any case, the value of wealth, from the point of view of the possessor, cannot be wholly measured in quantity, either absolute or relative. The "richest man" in any age or social regime is after all the richest man, and as such is in much the same position, relative to his age, as the richest man in any other; if Jacques Coeur had not all the dignity which hedges in a Rockefeller, it was not so much because his wealth was absolutely less than that of our "richest man," as because in his day wealth was not to the same extent the chief source of power.

Mr. Smith's independent and discriminating handling of his subject nowhere appears to better advantage than in respect to Luther, whom he knows best, or more strikingly than in respect to Calvin, whom he does not greatly admire. The treatment of Luther is particularly refreshing. Mr. Smith is neither "for" nor "against" Luther. Yet his estimate of Luther is no mere eclectic muddle of

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conflicting opinions, but a thoroughly discriminating estimate based upon knowledge and insight. From his presentation, Luther stands out as a great personality, a downright human person, often inconsistent but always honest, at once sympathetic and intolerant, sometimes childish and sometimes sublime, above all a born fighter, hating shams and opponents.

> He was both a dreamy mystic and a practical man of affairs; he saw visions and he knew how to make them realities; he was a God-intoxicated prophet and a cool calculator and hard worker for results. . . . His faith was as simple and passionate as his dogmatic distinctions were often sophistical and arid. . . . His hymns soar to heaven and his coarse jests trail in the mire. He was touched with profound melancholy, and yet he had a wholesome, ready laugh. His words are now brutal invectives and again blossom with the most exquisite flowers of the soul. He was subtle and simple; superstitious and wise; limited in his cultural sympathies, but very great in what he achieved.

Taken in detail, the book is admirable. How then has the author solved the general problem which he gives as the excuse for writing another history of the Reformation?—"the need of putting that movement in its proper relation to the economic and intellectual revolutions of the sixteenth century." No more difficult task than this can be undertaken by any historian—the task of exhibiting the relations of human activities which have little or no external or tangible connection. Employing different methods, Burckhardt attempted to do it for the Italian Renaissance, Green for the history of England, and Lamprecht for the history of Europe. Mr. Smith follows in general the method of Burckhardt rather than that of Green or Lamprecht. He describes the various aspects of the period—religious, economic, intellectual—in different chapters or parts of the book, and endeavors by interpretative comment and illustration to keep the reader aware that the activities successively narrated were occurring at the same time, and to show him how they were at every stage intimately related. Within the limits of this method, Mr. Smith has been eminently successful. No reader, seemingly, can miss the fact that the classical revival undermined the intellectual foundations of the Church, that the reformed doctrines found adherents chiefly among the rising middle class, that the discoveries of the age strengthened the middle class and shifted the center of political power to the centralized national states, or that kings and princes, hungry for revenue and instructed by Roman Law, employed the moral force of the new religions as a justification for curbing papal power and appropriating the property of the Church.

Such obvious relations, well known before, are exhibited with an uncommon wealth of illustrative material. But Mr. Smith often gets below the surface of these more obvious facts.

> Protestantism also harmonized with the capitalistic revolution in that its ethics are, far more than those of Catholicism, oriented by a reference to this world. The old monastic ideal of celebacy, solitude, mortification of the flesh, prayer and meditation, melted under the sun of a new prosperity. In its light men began to realize the ethical value of this life, of marriage, of children, of daily labor and of success and prosperity. . . . Moreover, the accentuation of the virtues of thrift and industry, which made capitalism and Calvinism allies, but reflected the standards natural to the bourgeois class.

This is very true; the protestant erected the qualities of the bourgeois into virtues superior to those of the world that compassed him about. But how did it happen that while the Protestant's ethics were "oriented by a reference to this world," his doctrine of justification provided him with an interior authority for denying on occasion the binding force of custom and the outer authority of this world? Industry and daily duty were virtues; but the virtue of obedience to magistrate or bishop or of conformity to the conventions of the community were often denied to be duties. Protestantism was at once an acceptance of this world and a withdrawal from it. To resolve this contradiction would require a deeper psychological analysis of motive and conduct, and of the genesis of social and religious theories, than Mr. Smith has attempted. He might say that this would be to go beyond the province of the historian. Perhaps it would be. If so, there are some interesting non-historical provinces to be explored.

CARL BECKER.

# Of Annual Anthologies and the Anthological Mind

*Anthology of Magazine Verse for* 1920 *and Yearbook of American Poetry, edited by W. S. Braithwaite. Boston: Small, Maynard & Co.*

AMERICA likes to have phenomena neatly summarized and ticketed. Much time may be saved by the use of digests and accepted rulings, and much time lost by the effort to form independent judgments. It is so much easier to follow the herd in fetish-worship than to be non-conformists that the great majority of us quite shamelessly delight in the second-hand opinions and ready-made reputations sanctioned by any semblance of official authority. Hence the tennis ranking, the annual crop of all-American elevens, the newspaper rating of college teams, the squash and polo classifications, and other similarly handy compilations of the athletically elect. The impulse in the world of letters is precisely the same. We have our Hall of Fame, Hundred Best Books, Five-foot Book Shelf, monthly lists of books most in demand at the libraries, and solemn selections of the "year's best" this, that, or the other. So Messrs. Small, Maynard & Co. are merely giving the public what the public wants in publishing their annual anthologies of short stories (edited by Mr. E. J. O'Brien), plays (edited by Mr. Burns Mantle), and magazine verse (edited by Mr. William Stanley Braithwaite). The thing would be done by someone, in any case; it has fatal points of interest as well as convenience; and perhaps criticism's only hope can be to arouse the public to the importance of examining the given editor's fitness for the factitious authority with which practical monopoly too often seems to invest him. Such an examination of Mr. Braithwaite's series of anthologies should furnish an instructive illustration of the point at issue, and is accordingly here undertaken.

Mr. Braithwaite includes in each of his volumes a somewhat dogmatic Introduction and a formidable apparatus criticus, but if one refuses to be imposed upon by appearances one soon finds grave reasons for questioning the editor's entire competence. In the first place, since so much of the beauty of poetry depends on subtle felicities of phrasing, one has a right to demand that a judge of poetry shall show himself sensitive to the niceties of the

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language by writing good English; but Mr. Braithwaite unfortunately has not mastered certain points in syntax and punctuation, while some standard idioms are unfamiliar to him, and his style in general is irritatingly maladroit. (It should be noted that the Introduction to the 1920 volume is well above his average in literary form and texture, doubtless because it appeared first in The Nation and was rigorously amended by that journal's editorial staff; the footnote on page ix, which did not appear in The Nation, amusingly reverts to Mr. Braithwaite's usual ineptitude.) Glancing back over the Introductions to his various volumes, including the earlier series, one finds such deplorable lapses as these:

"(The Elizabethan influence) declined on the borderlands of what historical criticism, taking safe refuge from the perils of spiritual definitions, *term* 'Jacobean' and 'Caroline' periods." "Milton, who was not included in the *Book of Elizabethan Verse,* is placed in this, since he was not so much as criticism maintains, the 'last great Elizabethan,' but 'the dawn out of the Elizabethan nightfall,' who was beginning and the ending of the Miltonic dignity" (*sic*). "Of the movement *to* which (they) are identified." "There have been, of course, other wars *in* which the Saxon mind has *touched* in modern times." "The collected *poems* of Pound *has* so little interest for the American public that *they* find it difficult to obtain an American publisher." "There is a range of inventiveness that might furnish a thesis for the erudite, *but should be of little concern to the true lover of poetry only where, in either case, the invention fails to communicate adequately and appealingly the substance dealt with.*" (For *only,* read *except* or delete *little.*) "It is a difference of culture, not spirit, that *contrasts* this English group of conformists *from* the Americans." "However *is* regarded the *forms* in which they write." "The thing criticism should remember when *it* considers American poetry today is, that *it* must be studied as American *poetry. It* is already a little too old to be regarded as an experiment, and *it* is yet too young to render a judgment as to *its* ephemeral or permanent character. But *it* is worthy," etc. (Aside from the damnable *it*eration here, the irritatingly maladroit quality appears in the second sentence of this last quotation; for the shift to the active infinitive, in the second clause, at least momentarily misleads one into supposing that the poetry is to render the judgment.)

Many other specimens could be given if space permitted; but these few will suffice to suggest the distressingly inferior character of Mr. Braithwaite's English. Should we then feel much respect for the literary opinions of anyone so lacking in mere literacy?

In the second place, if each volume is indeed to be the authoritative "Yearbook of American Poetry," one has a right to demand accuracy and reliability in textual and mechanical matters; but here too Mr. Braithwaite's work is far from satisfactory. The first poem in the volume for 1920 can be readily tested by the present writer because the number of the Yale Review in which it originally appeared happens to be at hand; upon collating the two texts one finds that Mr. Braithwaite has carelessly printed diamond for diamonds in a line of plurals, and that he has quite ruined the following stanza—

> But when the afternoon between the clouds
> Leaves adrift cool patches of the sky
> Floating like deep stretches of the sea
> Between floes of polar snow—

by 'telescoping' the second and third lines, thus:

> But when the afternoon between the clouds
> Leaves adrift cool patches of the sea,
> Between floes of polar snow.

Of course, the other poems, which happen to be less easy to check up at the moment, may be letter-perfect; but one naturally feels little confidence that this indeed the case. And so it goes with the other sections of the book: when one finds obvious errors in the familiar and verifiable, one hesitates to believe that there is errorlessness in the unfamiliar and unverifiable. In the page and a half of Acknowledgments for instance, Mr. W. R. Benét's name lacks the accent, the title of his volume is wrongly given, and four lines below there is a gross typographical blunder. The note on page 112 adds a typographical slip to its faults of expression. The Index of Poets and Poems is very imperfectly alphabetized: Masefield, for example, is a little hard to find in the sequence Markham, Marks, Masters, Marple, Masefield, Marshall, Martyn, Matson; and one feels no certainty that the Carlyle F. MacIntyre of page 143 is indeed a different person from the Carlyle F. McIntyre of page 146. In the list of Volumes of Poems Published during 1919-1920, the names of Pamela Blanco and Danford Barney are misspelled, Francis Thompson is printed as two poets, and similar errors are fairly frequent. In the strangely heterogeneous Select List of Books about Poets and Poetry (we are left in doubt as to whether this list is limited to publications of the year 1919-1920), the first title is wrongly given as Skepticism, Ward's lecture is wrongly credited to the Yale Press, etc. In view of the amount of this sort of defectiveness, we can hardly escape one of two conclusions: either Mr. Braithwaite is not sufficiently conscientious in the performance of his editorial duties, or he really is not qualified to perform them properly.

Finally, if this present series of poetic Yearbooks is to be a monopoly, with some pretensions to permanency of record, the public has a right to demand that the editor shall hold nothing back for publication elsewhere and that each volume shall be complete in itself and thoroughly exhaustive. Unfortunately Mr. Braithwaite is at fault here also. The Introduction to each volume should be an illuminating analysis of the year's poetry, based on the data supplied by the rest of the volume, but this survey, indispensable to the completeness of the editor's work, is apparently published by Mr. Braithwaite only in the Boston Transcript. He cheerfully repudiates his obligations by stating, in the 1918 volume, "The year in poetry I shall not discuss in this issue" (!), and in the 1919 volume, "I shall let this year's issue of the Anthology speak for itself" (!), or in the 1920 volume by simply reprinting for his Introduction a general discussion of British and American poetry which he had previously published as a magazine article, while the earlier Introductions are for the most part idle vaporings on poetic theory with no particular bearing upon the task in hand; now naturally, this sort of evasion or makeshift is fatal to any claim of really first-rate editorial work. There are occasional references, too, to other interesting material which really belongs in these volumes but must be sought elsewhere. Each year's issue, again, to be complete in itself, should contain an enunciation of Mr. Braithwaite's principles and method of selection, a list of the magazines consulted for his Anthology and for his Index of Poets and Poems, and (most annoyingly unintelligent of omissions) an index of the authors of the poems printed in the anthology.

It would be unjust to deny to Mr. Braithwaite any

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credit at all for planning and executing his laborious task. If not the ideal editor, he is at least the pioneer, and also presumably the developer of a fairly satisfactory system for handling this somewhat complicated problem. It is to be hoped that he, or his publishers, or some competitor will profit by the critical examination here made. But much more is it to be hoped that poets and public will cease to be exercised over the findings of unaccredited arbiters. For far more important than an anthologist's realization and amendment of his shortcomings is the emancipation of the public from the anthological mind. Nor is the general reader alone at fault. Some of our young poets have been seen almost to fawn upon Mr. Braithwaite for the sake of securing inclusion in his supposed "roll of honor," while librarians and even college instructors have cited his opinions as if authoritative. Obviously, such untoward incidents are due to the prevalence of just that mental habit which the present article seeks to arraign—the habit, namely, of passively accepting ready-made judgments and canonizing the printed page, without any examination of the author's qualifications and without any testing of his work by reference to the great standards of our language and literature. Reliance upon second-hand summaries, tolerance of inferior workmanship, subservience to ill-grounded reputation, and absence of independent critical scrutiny,—these are the characteristics of the anthological mind. By all means let us be duly grateful for the aid afforded by compilers and editors, but let us never surrender the privilege and the duty of challenging all things and holding fast only that which is good. Fetishism is degrading in literary matters as well as in religion or pathology.

LAWRENCE MASON.

# The Heel of Achilles

*The Heel of Achilles, by E. M. Delafield. New York: The Macmillan Co.*

LIKE Becky Sharp, Lydia Raymond, the heroine of The Heel of Achilles, was an orphan and determined to make the most of it. Like Becky too, and incidentally all correct models of virtue, she was intelligent, industrious and careful. By sticking to her grandfather's maxims, chief of which was, "Always let other people talk about themselves," she rose by degrees from shabbiness in a third-rate town to marriage into a Devonshire county family. Her dowdy uncles and aunts she discreetly forgot in the third-rate town; only letting them come to Devonshire when the county family was in Switzerland.

It would therefore seem easy to list the flaw in Lydia's character as egoism, grade A, class Becky Sharp. But Miss Delafield is subtler than that. Miss Delafield in her dry, precise impersonal and rather slow way, is diabolically subtle about certain kinds of female egoism. As she unrolls the document of Lydia's motives and aspirations, we see that snobbery is really a minor part of it. The clue to Lydia is that she was what her prophetic grandfather called a "situation-snatcher." She belonged to that not inconsiderable group of women who want above all things a swirl of emotional attention around them, not amorous attention, because the type is essentially frigid, but an intensity of personal interest. Therefore Lydia was never so happy as when she was unhappy. Therefore she declared with immense satisfaction, "I am an orphan," and later "I am a widow." She resented the aunt who nursed her so devotedly through pneumonia that the aunt herself got ill and distracted attention from the convalescent. And Lydia in turn nearly killed herself nursing her dying and disillusioned husband, because if there is no other way for the Lydia-type to get to the center of the stage she attempts to reach it through ostentatious sacrifice.

Left with an only child, Jennie, Lydia exploited the limitless possibilities of motherhood for self-indulgent sacrifice. Under the whip of "mother is only living and working for you," Jennie, although rebellious, was kept in leading-strings until a rough Canadian cut them. This was the wound in Lydia's heel of Achilles. For Jennie only, Lydia had felt something approaching love, and yet this part of herself was not "grateful" for a million sacrifices, she was jubilant to get away from them. Dazed with pain, Lydia sees her true self for a moment, and here the book ends.

It is the best book Miss Delafield has written. With the grave exception that Lydia's married life is almost entirely ignored, not one psychological verity is missed. It is an exceptionally complete study of a by no means exceptional type, and Lydia's varying milieus of small town, London boardinghouse, and Devonshire rectory are admirably sketched. The style too is less arid and choppy than in Tension and The Pelicans. Lydia is the most vivid portrait among all Miss Delafield's competent portraits of unpleasant women, and perhaps this is because Lydia has a dash of pleasantness.

SIGNE TOKSVIG.

# Selected Current Books

The Glass of Fashion, Anonymous. Putnam.
An attempt by the author of the Mirrors of Downing Street to offset the impression of English society created by Margot and Colonel Repington.

Russia from the English Embassy, by David R. Francis. Scribners.
Mr. Francis tells his story of Russia before and after Bolshevism.

Foundations of Sovereignty and Othe- Essays, by Harold J. Laski. Harcourt.
Mr. Laski, now of the London School of Economics, collects his essays on the institution of the state.

One Act Plays by Modern Authors, edited by Helen Louise Cohen. Harcourt.
A collection of short plays with introduction.

Decadence, by Remy de Gourmont. Harcourt.
A collection of essays on the culture of ideas, translated by William Aspinwall Bradley. Portrait.

Eric Dorn, by Ben Hecht. Putnam.
The first novel of the clever Chicago writer.

## Contributors

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